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I. INTRODUCTION
Betty McKay served twenty-seven years in prison.1 During her past
three years on parole, she became a motivational speaker, justice advocate,
and organizer.2 Similarly, John Windham served thirty years in prison.3
Since his release from prison to parole in 2018, he became a motivational
speaker and consultant, and works with nonprofits providing reentry
services to others formerly incarcerated.4 But that is not all Ms. McKay
and Mr. Windham have in common: Neither has ever been able to vote.5
They are among the 50,000 parolees in the State of California that, despite
having served their prison sentences, have been barred from voting by the
California State Constitution until completion of their parole.6
Last November, that changed. Californians voted7 to amend the State
Constitution to permit parolees to vote after completion of their prison

1. Our Stories, Y ES ON 17, https://yeson17.vote/our-stories/ [https://perma.cc/
L3BF-HS47].
2. Id. Ms. McKay “is currently an Organizing Fellow with Essie Justice Group,
where she is working on the #FreeBlackMamas campaign – a campaign focused on
providing bail for incarcerated, Black mothers.” See Webinar Wednesday: Free the Vote!,
INITIATE JUST., https://www.initiatejustice.org/event/webinar-wednesday-free-the-vote/
[https://perma.cc/ QAU2-A936]. She is also a member of the Sister Warriors Freedom
Coalition and a graduate of Initiate Justice’s Institute of Impacted Leaders. Id. The Institute of
Impacted Leaders is a twelve-week “organizing training program for people directly
impacted by mass incarceration.” The Institute of Impacted Leaders: About the Institute,
INITIATE JUST., https://www.initiatejustice.org/our-work/institute-of-impacted-leaders/
[https://perma.cc/ B4XQ- SGPE]. The Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition is a campaign
led by formerly incarcerated people in fourteen chapters across the state of California
seeking to replace mass incarceration with “transformative justice processes and communitybased alternatives.” See Freedom 2030 Campaign, SISTER WARRIORS FREEDOM COAL.,
https://sisterwarriors free.org/ [https://perma.cc/PBJ2-L2NK].
3. Telephone Interview with John Windham, Founder & CEO, We All We Got
JMW Found. (Feb. 21, 2021). To learn more about his story and work, see WE ALL WE
GOT JMW FOUND., https://www.weallwegotfoundation.org/ [https://perma.cc/LD7U-9ZH7].
4. See About Us, W E A LL W E G OT JMW F OUND ., https://www.weallwegot
foundation.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/FRP3-MXM2].
5. Our Stories, supra note 1. Mr. Windham and Ms. McKay were the face of the
“Yes on 17” campaign to pass Proposition 17. See infra note 9.
6. Bob Egelko & Michael Cabanatuan, Prop. 17, Giving Californians on Parole
the Right to Vote, Wins, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 6, 2020, 4:23 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
local-politics/article/Prop-17-giving-people-on-parole-right-to-vote-15699622.php
[https://perma.cc/6V72-VXR7].
7. California Proposition 17 Election Results: Give Vote to Felons on Parole, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/results-
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sentence.8 Known on the ballot as “Proposition 17,”9 the measure reenfranchised10 an estimated 50,000 parolees who were prohibited from
registering to vote until the completion of their parole.11 However, this
modification to the State Constitution preserved denial of the right to vote
for convicted felons while still incarcerated.12 In California, that means
approximately 95,000 felons13 remain ineligible to vote, and nationally,
california-proposition-17-give-vote-to-felons-on-parole.html [https://perma.cc/H4T7-MNYJ].
The measure passed by a vote of 58.6% in favor over votes for 41.4% against. Id.
8. LEGIS . ANALYST ’ S O FF., P ROPOSITION 17 R ESTORES RIGHT TO V OTE AFTER
COMPLETION OF PRISON TERM. LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. 1 (2020).
9. Id. The amendment altered sections 2 and 4 of Article II of the California
Constitution to read:
SEC. 2. (a) A United States citizen 18 years of age and resident in this State may
vote.
(b) An elector disqualified from voting while serving a state or federal prison
term, as described in Section 4, shall have their right to vote restored upon the
completion of their prison term.
...
SEC. 4. The Legislature shall prohibit improper practices that affect elections
and shall provide for the disqualification of electors while mentally incompetent
or . . . serving a state or federal prison term for the conviction of a felony.
CAL. SEC’Y STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: TEXT OF PROPOSED
LAWS 10 (2020). The new provisions are in italics. Id. Formerly, section 4
allowed for the disqualification of electors “while imprisoned or on parole.” Id.
The amendments removed this language to limit disqualification to those serving
a state or federal prison term. Id.
10. Although the right to vote is technically restored after completing a state or
federal prison term for felony conviction, registration remains a necessary next step, either
by registering online or completing a hardcopy voter registration card. Voting Rights:
Persons with a Criminal History, CAL. S EC’Y S TATE, https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/
voting-resources/voting-california/who-can-vote-california/voting-rights-californians
[https://perma.cc/NAV4-9VRJ]. But merely taking that step to register to vote is not the
only barrier formerly convicted felons face to political participation. Misinformation abounds.
Jewel Wicker, First-Time Black Voters, from Gen Z to New Citizens to Snoop Dogg, on
What’s Driving Them, NBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2020, 3:01 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/nbcblk/black-voters-series-what-s-driving-people-vote-first-time-n1244181 [https://
perma.cc/Q9W8-C99R]. Even nationally famous rapper Snoop Dogg did not vote until
the 2020 elections because he did not know he could. Id. “For many years, they had me
brainwashed thinking that you couldn’t vote because you had a criminal record.” Id. Snoop
Dogg, who lives in L.A., could have voted before the passage of Proposition 17 because
his criminal records had been expunged. Id.
11. Egelko & Cabanatuan, supra note 6.
12. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.
aspx [https://perma.cc/DCZ2-G4DY].
13. DIV. CORR. POL’Y RSCH. & INTERNAL OVERSIGHT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. &
REHAB., WEEKLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT JANUARY 13, 2021, at 1 (2021).
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation population decreased
sharply, nearly 21%, from about 123,100 inmates in February, 2020, to 97,000 in October,
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more than 5 million people with prior felony convictions remain ineligible
to vote as the direct result of state felon disenfranchisement laws.14
California is now the twentieth state to either automatically restore
voting rights upon release from prison, or not revoke voting rights in the
first place, joining a national trend toward restoring voting rights to people
with past convictions.15 However, these changes take place on a state-by2020, as a result of measures taken to slow the spread of COVID-19 in jails and prisons.
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., THE 2021-22 BUDGET: STATE CORRECTIONAL POPULATION OUTLOOK
1–2 (2020). The sharp reduction is attributable to reduced prison commitments and early
releases from prison to post release community supervision. Id. at 2. Those inmates
released early on post-release community supervision can now register to vote. Voting
Rights: Persons with a Criminal History, supra note 10. For convenience and simplicity,
this Comment uses the term felon to refer to individuals who have been convicted of a
felony.
14. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET. AL., THE S ENT’G P ROJECT, LOCKED OUT 2020:
ESTIMATES OF PEOPLE DENIED VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO A FELONY CONVICTION 4 (2020).
15. What is Prop 17?, YES ON 17, https://yeson17.vote/what-is-prop-17/ [https://
perma.cc/5GGL-C7NN]. Since 2017, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Nevada,
Colorado, and Louisiana have all expanded access to the ballot for people with past
convictions. Id. On May 28, 2019, Colorado Governor Jared Polis signed into law HB
19-1266, restoring voting rights to parolees upon release from detention or incarceration.
See H.R. 19-1266, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019). Colorado restores the
right to vote in both state and federal elections, regardless of whether the conviction was
in state or federal court. Voters with Convictions FAQs, COLO. SEC’Y STATE JENA GRISWOLD,
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/FAQs/VotingAndConviction.html [https://perma.
cc/44GF-Z89M]. Similarly, Assembly Bill 431 in Nevada restores voting rights immediately
and automatically upon release from prison regardless of the category of felony or whether
the individual was convicted in another state or federal court. See Restoration of Voting
Rights in Nevada, N EV. S EC ’Y S TATE , https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/elections/voters/
restoration-of-voting-rights-in-nevada [https://perma.cc/S4Z2-V5T4]. The change restored
rights to citizens who had been permanently disenfranchised after receiving “dishonorable
discharge” from probation or parole and restored rights to those with “category B”
convictions immediately upon release, where previously “category B” individuals did not
get voting rights restored for another two years after completion of their sentence. Voting
Rights Restoration Efforts in Nevada, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 30, 2019), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-nevada
[https://perma.cc/5P35-ESGH]. The Colorado and Nevada legislation have greater
permanence than the reforms in New York, where Governor Cuomo signed an executive
order restoring voting rights to individuals on parole upon release from incarceration. See
Governor Cuomo Signs Executive Order to Restore Voting Rights to New Yorkers on
Parole, N.Y. STATE (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomosigns-executive-order-restore-voting-rights-new-yorkers-parole [https://perma.cc/ACH5HPX2]. Cuomo explained his decision to issue the order, saying, “It is unconscionable to
deny voting rights to New Yorkers who have paid their debt and have re-entered society.
This reform will reduce disenfranchisement and will help restore justice and fairness to
our democratic process. Withholding or delaying voting rights diminishes our democracy.” Id.

937

ATKINSON (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/25/2022 3:21 PM

state basis,16 and the gradual restoration of rights to some––but not all––
convicted felons distracts from the role some state felon disenfranchisement
laws may play in race-based vote denial.
As a Black man, Mr. Windham is among the 75% of men leaving
California prisons that are Black, Latino, or Asian American,17 who comprise
less than 28.5% of the state’s population.18 Data from 2017 shows the
imprisonment rate for Black men in California was ten times more than
white men, and imprisonment rates for Black women ten times that of
white women.19 The disparity begs the question: Do state felon voting
disenfranchisement laws impermissibly deny the right to vote in a racially
discriminatory manner?

His action was lauded for re-enfranchising African Americans and Hispanic New Yorkers
comprising 71% of previously disenfranchised parolees, the New York Legislature passed
bill S.830 and Governor Cuomo signed it into law on May 4, 2021 which converted the
executive order into law. Id; Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in New York, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (May 4, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/
voting-rights-restoration-efforts-new-york [https://perma.cc/D8TN-RJ67]. Governors in
Kentucky have had less success. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. Louisiana has
taken much smaller steps. On May 31, 2018, Governor Edwards signed HB 265 into law
as Act No. 636 to restore voting rights only after serving five years of parole. Elizabeth
Crisp, Gov. John Bel Edwards Signs Law Restoring Felon Voting Rights After Five Years,
ADVOCATE (May 31, 2018, 4:29 PM) [https://perma.cc/GP92-QPJ6]. Florida took two
steps forward and one step back. In November 2018, Florida Voters restored voting rights
to formerly convicted felons, excepting only felony convictions for murder or “sexual
offenses,” by approving Amendment 4 to amend the state constitution. Patricia Mazzei &
Michael Wines, How Republicans Undermined Ex-Felon Voting Rights in Florida, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/florida-felons-voting.html
[https://perma.cc/R6CB-TWFQ]. But in June 2019, the Republican Governor signed
a law requiring the payment of court fines and fees before voting rights are restored. Id.
For many, payment of all fines and fees is an insurmountable hurdle. For Florida resident
Mr. Kelly, paying his full restitution for $600,000 would, at the rate his current payment
plan of $100 per month, take more than 400 years to pay off. The Daily, The Field: The
Fight for Voting Rights in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/10/02/podcasts/the-daily/voting-rights-florida-election.html [https://perma.cc/Z7MLMYBH].
16. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons, supra note 12.
17. What is Prop 17?, supra note 15.
18. Quick Facts: California Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA [https://perma.cc/7WVN-P7HT].
19. CAL. DEP’T. OF CORR. & REHAB., OFFENDER DATA POINTS: OFFENDER DEMOGRAPHICS
FOR THE 24-M ONTH P ERIOD, E NDING D ECEMBER 2017, at 14, 30 (2018). See also CAL.
DEP’T. OF CORR. & REHAB., OFFENDER DATA POINTS FOR THE 24-MONTH PERIOD ENDING
IN JUNE 2018, at 30 (2019) (finding the composition of the California inmate population
as of June 30, 2019 to be 28.3% black, 20.9% white, and 44.2% Hispanic).
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II. FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL:
CHALLENGES TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
IN THE AFTERMATH OF RICHARDSON V. RAMIREZ
Despite the common conception that voting is a fundamental right,20 the
United States Constitution does not provide for universal suffrage,21 even
in the wake of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments.22
A state’s choice to enact felon disenfranchisement laws is still within
the bounds of the Constitution.23 Three years after Justice Thurgood Marshall
wrote for a majority of the Supreme Court holding all adult citizens have
a right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause and all qualifications of
that right would be subject to strict scrutiny,24 the Court found an affirmative
20. Indeed, the Supreme Court has referred to “the political franchise of voting” as
a “fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo. v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). “Voting is a fundamental right in the United States, yet in the
2004 Presidential election, over five million people were unable to cast a vote because of
a felony conviction at some point in their lives.” Angela Behr ens, Voting—Not
Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon
Disfranchisement Laws, 89 M INN . L. REV. 231, 231 (2004). “The existence of [felon
disenfranchisement] laws therefore calls into question the notion of voting as a fundamental
right.” Id. Notably, Chief Justice Warren’s declaration that “any alleged infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized” because “the
right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and de mocratic society” that is
“preservative of other basic civil and political rights” predated the Court’s finding in
Richardson authorizing the felon disenfranchisement carve out for this most fundamental
of rights. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964); see infra notes 24 and 26.
21. John Crain, How Congress Can Craft a Felon Enfranchisement Law that Will
Survive Supreme Court Review, 29 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 9 (2019).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting vote denial on account of race); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX (expanding suffrage to women); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll
taxes in federal elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (changing the voting age to 18).
23. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54, 56 (1974) (finding that California
could, “consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, exclude
from [voting] convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles” because
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “applicability to state laws disenfranchising
felons[] is of controlling significance” and distinguishes felon disenfranchisement from
other limitations on state voting qualifications found invalid by the Supreme Court).
24. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (noting that the constitutionally
protected “equal right to vote” is “not absolute; the States have the power to impose voter
qualifications, and to regulate access to the [voting] franchise in other ways” but that “as
a general matter, ‘before that right (to vote) can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction
and the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny”
(quoting Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970))). The Court clarified that a state’s
showing of a substantial state interest was insufficient to justify “unnecessarily burden[ing] or
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sanction in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment for the exclusion of
the right to vote for those convicted of a crime.25 This opinion, Richardson
v. Ramirez,26 affirmed the presumption that state felon disenfranchisement
laws are constitutional unless shown to be otherwise. 27 The Court
acknowledged the difficulty of interpreting constitutional provisions, the
scarcity of legislative history for section 2, and the intent of the Amendment
framers regarding the exemptions to the right to vote.28 Yet, the Court
decided the language was intended to mean what it said: A “participation
in rebellion or other crime”29 can be grounds for exemption from the right
to vote.30 The language “except for participation in rebellion, or other

restrict[ing] constitutionally protected activity. Id. at 343. Instead, the Court applied strict
scrutiny, requiring a showing of a compelling state interest narrowly tailored to achieve
the state’s “legitimate objectives.” Id.
25. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54–56. Richardson firmly distinguished felon
disenfranchisement from the usual requirement of strict scrutiny applied to equal protection
claims and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the government need prove disenfranchising
people with felony convictions serves a compelling state interest. See Matthew E. Feinberg,
Suffering without Suffrage: Why Felon Disenfranchisement Constitutes Vote Denial under
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 61, 68 (2011)
(discussing how section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits state felon disenfranchisement
without any further state justification); see also Note, The Disenfranchisement of ExFelons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box,” 102 HARV. L. REV.
1300, 1302 n.8 (1989) (“[Section] 2 . . . obviated any need to justify” felon disenfranchisement
“with a compelling state interest.”).
26. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56. Douglass, Marshall, and Brennan dissented in
this 6-3 decision, referring to voting as a “fundamental right” and condemning the historical
analysis as “unsound.” Id. The Justices noted the proposed second section of the Fourteenth
Amendment “went to a joint committee containing only the phrase ‘participation in
rebellion’ and emerged with ‘or other crime’ inexplicably tacked on.” Id. at 73.
27. Id. at 56. Because the Fourteenth Amendment included an affirmative sanction
to exclude, the Supreme Court found that state laws excluding felons from the franchise
were not inconsistent with or violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The Court
interpreted section 2 as exempting felon disenfranchisement from strict-scrutiny analysis,
which is the standard of review for other voting qualifications. Thomas J. Miles, Felon
Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 89–90 (2004).
28. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43.
29. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided: “Representatives shall be
apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State,
or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall
bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 2.
30. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43.
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crime,” the Court noted, was never altered during floor debates proposing
changes to the language.31
Because felon disenfranchisement laws are presumptively constitutional,
there are limited ways to prevent their application. 32 Plaintiffs turn to
constitutional challenges, primarily using the Fourteenth Amendment, to
oppose felon disenfranchisement statutes for having a disparate impact on
a protected class.33 The Supreme Court has, however, affirmed the rejection
of such constitutional challenges on a number of occasions.34 In the last
three decades, petitioners have also launched attacks against felon
disenfranchisement laws under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
to argue impermissible vote dilution or vote denial on account of race.35
Authors have argued litigating felon disenfranchisement laws is ineffective;
the future of section 2 challenges in the felon disenfranchisement context
is uncertain;36 and proponents of eliminating felon disenfranchisement
laws should therefore look to legislation as the solution.37 These arguments
have merit––short of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the only way

31. Id. at 45.
32. See Miles, supra note 27, at 89–90.
33. Id. at 89–91.
34. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53 (first citing Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117
(M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); and then citing Beacham v. Braterman, 396
U.S. 12 (1969)).
35. See William Walton Liles, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws:
Past, Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 624–25 (2007). Wesley v. Collins, 791
F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986) was one of the first cases to apply a section 2 challenge to state
felon disenfranchisement laws. Id. at 625. See infra notes 80–83, 99 and accompanying
text for the language of section 2.
36. Erin Kelly, Do the Crime, Do the Time—and Then Some: Problems with Felon
Disenfranchisement and Possible Solutions, 51 U. TOL. L. REV. 389, 398 (2020) (finding
use for section 2 of the VRA uncertain given the circuit split and Supreme Court’s repeat
denial of certiorari on these cases).
37. See Amanda J. Wong, Locked Up, Then Locked Out: The Case for Legislative—
Rather Than Executive—Felon Disenfranchisement Reform, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1679,
1713 (2019) (arguing for reform via national legislation rather than gubernatorial action
and promoting passage of the Democracy Restoration Act first introduced to Congress in
2008 by Russ Feingold); Kierra W. Mai, A Uniform Approach to Felon Disenfranchisement:
Is the Multi-State System an Artifact of Slavery?, 13 IDAHO CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J., 2019,
at 1, 4, 42 (arguing for a uniform national approach and encouraging Congress to “addres[s]
felon disenfranchisement as an amendment to the Voting Rights Act” to eliminate patchwork
state felon disenfranchisement laws disproportionately affecting Black citizens); see also
Liles, supra note 35, at 616 (suggesting that Congress and state legislatures are the best
forums for plaintiffs to seek abolishment of state disenfranchisement laws).
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to abolish felon disenfranchisement is on a state-by-state basis.38 In the
meantime, however, with Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendment challenges
frequently failing, plaintiff options to challenge the application of felon
disenfranchisement laws on the basis of racial discrimination are bleak.
The VRA, intended by Congress to prevent racial discrimination from
affecting voter qualifications, is the only remaining tool to effectuate the
promises enshrined in the Fifteenth Amendment.39
This Comment establishes why the Supreme Court should decide the
current circuit split in favor of permitting VRA section 2 challenges to
root out the racially discriminatory effect of state felon disenfranchisement
laws, where applicable and provable. After briefly addressing the long
history of felon disenfranchisement, this Comment addresses the varied
landscape and discriminatory effect of state felon disenfranchisement
laws, the limitations of other challenges, and the status of the circuit split
on the issue of VRA challenges. Then, this Comment argues the viability
of VRA section 2 challenges and endorses the totality of the circumstances
test within the amended section 2 as the proper test the Supreme Court
should adopt to resolve the circuit split and provide a remedy for felon
disenfranchisement laws that have a racially discriminatory effect. To
guide the Court’s clarification of the proper application of the totality of
the circumstances analysis, this Comment addresses how the Ninth Circuit’s

38. When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, 29 states had felon
disenfranchisement provisions written into their constitutions. Richardson, 418 U.S. at
48 n.14. While some states have seen partial restoration of voting rights via legislation or
executive order, amending the state constitution is the most permanent way to reenfranchise
felons. See Martine J. Price, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs.
Litigation, 11 J.L. & Pol’y 369, 400, 405–408 (2002). For example, in 2016, the Virginia
Supreme Court found that its governor’s executive order reenfranchising felons violated
the state constitution. Lauren Latterell Powell, Concealed Motives: Rethinking Fourteenth
Amendment and Voting Rights Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement, 22 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 383, 399 (2017). The processes for constitutional amendment differ by state and
include permitting ballot initiative amendments, calling constitutional conventions, and
submitting legislative amendments to voter ballots for consideration. See Amending State
Constitutions, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Amending_state_constitutions [https://
perma.cc/BH74-MDQJ]. Delaware is the only state whose legislature can amend the state
constitution without putting the amendment to a vote on the ballot. Id.
39. The John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act is one of the latest
Congressional efforts to “restor[e] and strengthen[] the protections of the VRA.” Myrna
Pérez & Tim Lau, How to Restore and Strengthen the Voting Rights Act, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/
how-to-restore-and-strengthen-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/2N2R-UR6Y]. Although
the Act passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 219–212 on August 24, 2021,
Senate Republicans blocked the bill from advancing in November, 2021. See S. 4263,
116th Cong. (2020); Clare Foran, Senate Republicans Block John Lewis Voting Rights Bill
in Key Vote, CNN (Nov. 3, 2021, 4:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/03/politics/
john-lewis-voting-rights-act-senate-vote/index.html [https://perma.cc/RNE3-HHRD].
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opinion in Farrakhan II40 provides a roadmap for correctly applying the
section 2 analysis, and also, where that court went wrong in Farrakhan
III.41 Lastly, this Comment examines the use of felon disenfranchisement
laws to suppress the African American vote, particularly considering the
disproportionate mass incarceration of African Americans in the wake of
the Civil Rights Movement. In conclusion, where a plaintiff can show in
the totality of the circumstances that state felon disenfranchisement laws
have a racially discriminatory effect in violation of section 2 of the VRA,
the remedy must be to strike down the law causing racially discriminatory
vote denial.
A. The History of Felon Disenfranchisement
Felon disenfranchisement has a long history in the Western World
dating back to Ancient Greece, continuing in Medieval Europe, and
following colonists to the United States.42 In Greece, criminals designated
“infamous” were banned from civic participation––they could not vote,
appear in court, hold office, or even make public speeches.43 In Rome,
commission of a crime involving “moral turpitude” could also result in
this “civil death.”44 Proponents of felon disenfranchisement refer to this
ancient heritage as justification for the continued disenfranchisement of
felons in the United States.45
Felon disenfranchisement laws have been on the books in the United
States since its inception.46 As early as the Seventeenth Century, preventing
civic involvement was used to punish moral crimes such as drunkenness.47
Between 1776 and 1821, eleven states—Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio,
Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Connecticut, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri,
and New York—adopted constitutions that disenfranchised felons or

40. Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan II), 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010).
41. Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan III), 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010).
42. George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics,
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 852–53 (2005); see also Bailey Figler, A Vote for Democracy:
Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 723, 728 (2006).
43. Figler, supra note 42.
44. Feinberg, supra note 25, at 65.
45. Roger Clegg, George T. Conway III & Kenneth K. Lee, The Case Against Felon
Voting, U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 2008, at 1, 3.
46. Brooks, supra note 42.
47. Id.
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permitted their statutory disenfranchisement.48 By the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, eighteen more states joined their ranks.49
The long, entrenched history of felon disenfranchisement played a role
in justifying its continued survival. In 2009, the First Circuit justified
denial of a challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws in part upon its
historicity, noting: “Felon disenfranchisement statutes are not like all
other voting qualifications. Congress has treated such laws differently.
They are deeply rooted in our history, in our laws, and in our Constitution.”50
Judge Andrew Kleinfeld also raised the historicity of felon disenfranchisement
as a presumably legitimate state interest during oral argument en banc in
Farrakhan III.51 Be wary of such arguments––although states have the
prerogative to enact felon disenfranchisement laws, no amount of longstanding
history or tradition can override the impermissibility of exercising that
prerogative in a discriminatory manner.52
B. State Authority to Determine Voter Qualifications & the Varied
Landscape of State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
In addition to the historicity of felon disenfranchisement, states are
traditionally understood to have the constitutional authority to establish
voter qualifications,53 including the inclusion or exclusion of a limitation
on voting for those convicted of crimes.54 States possess “broad powers
to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be

48. Id. at 853.
49. Id.
50. Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2009).
51. Oral Argument, Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d 990 (2010) (No. 06-35669).
52. As noted in petitioners’ writ of certiorari in Simmons v. Galvin, “an affirmative
sanction,” such as that in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “is not the same as an
unlimited sanction;” the allowance is limited “by the constraints of the Fifteenth Amendment . . .
which expressly outlaws voting discrimination on account of race.” Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 17, Simmons, 575 F.3d 24 (No. 09-920) (citing Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d
305, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2006) (Parker, J., dissenting)).
53. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. amend. X; U.S. Const. amend. XVII; see also
Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications Clause
of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 212 n.306 (2015) (“[T]he Constitution gives the states
exclusive authority to set voter qualifications under the Qualifications Clause . . . .”);
Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89,
122–24 (2014) (“[T]he U.S. Constitution does not directly grant the right to vote to
anyone” and “delegates to the states in the first instance the right to dictate the times,
places, and manner of holding elections and provides that states determine rules for voter
qualifications.”).
54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

944

ATKINSON (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 933, 2021]

3/25/2022 3:21 PM

Racially Discriminatory Felon Disenfranchisement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

exercised,” including “[r]esidence requirements, age, [and] previous criminal
record,” with the only federal limitation being discrimination.55
The landscape of criminal disenfranchisement changed drastically in
the last fifty years.56 Although only 1.17 million convicted or formerly
convicted felons were disenfranchised in 1976, more than 6.1 million individuals
were as of 2016.57 This increase is because of the uptick in mass incarceration,
not an increase in state disenfranchisement laws.58 In fact, trends across
the nation are irrefutably leaning towards reenfranchisement.
In the last thirty-five years, more than half of the fifty states either
narrowed the scope of their felon disenfranchisement laws or used
legislation or executive action to inform persons with felony convictions
of their voting rights. 59 As of August 5, 2020, the eleven states that
disenfranchise felons indefinitely for certain crimes are now in the
minority.60 Only two of those eleven states—Virginia and Kentucky—
permanently disenfranchise,61 although some of those eleven states—like
Delaware—permanently disenfranchise certain disqualifying felonies, such

55. Brooks, supra note 42, at 853 (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1959)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 cl. 1 (“The House
of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People
of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the state Legislature.”).
56. See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENT’G PROJECT, VOTING RIGHTS IN THE ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION: A PRIMER 3 (2021).
57. Id.
58. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF C OLORBLINDNESS 60 (2012) (“Convictions for drug offenses are the single most
important cause of the explosion in incarceration rates in the United States.”); see also THE
SENT’G PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1–2, 7 (2020). The rise of mass incarceration
during the Civil Rights Movement, Nixon and Reagans’ War on Drugs, and Clinton’s
Tough on Crime agenda disproportionately targeted blacks and correlated with a rise in
black activism. ALEXANDER, supra, at 48–50, 56.
59. CHUNG , supra note 56, at 4 (“Among these: Ten states either repealed or
amended lifetime disenfranchisement laws. Eight states expanded voting rights to some or
all persons on probation and/or parole. Thirteen states eased the restoration process for
persons seeking to have their right to vote restored after the completion of their sentence.
Three states improved data and information sharing.”).
60. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons, supra note 12. The eleven states permitting
indefinite disenfranchisement are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
61. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/
voting-rights/voter-restoration/felony-disenfranchisement-laws-map [https://perma.cc/
UP2D-MH8C].
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as murder, bribery, and sexual offenses. 62 Even some states that
permanently disenfranchise retain the possibility of reenfranchisement,
however remote, through a petition process after completion of a sentence
or by executive pardon.63 Sixteen states and the District of Columbia
disenfranchise felons while incarcerated but restore the right to vote when
released.64 Twenty-one states revoke the right to vote until the convicted
felon has completed not only the prison sentence, but any applicable
probation or parole.65 Only two states, Maine and Vermont, have chosen
to altogether eliminate disenfranchisement for people with criminal
convictions.66
Because states have near absolute control over voter qualifications and
each state has different values, culture, and history, every state has
different felon disenfranchisement laws.67 State disenfranchisement laws
are highly politicized. In a 2015 executive order, Kentucky Governor Steve
Beshear, a Democrat, restored voting rights to those with non-violent
felony convictions 68 upon completion of sentence. 69 His Republican
successor promptly reversed the order after taking office later that same

62. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons, supra note 12.
63. See id. Mississippi provides a creative option for an individual’s restoration of
voting rights “by two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature.” Id.; see also
MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 253.
64. Once released from prison, restoration of the right to vote still requires voter
registration. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons, supra note 12; see also Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 61.
65. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 61. Some of these states
require all restitution, fines, and fees to be paid before the restoration of voting rights. Id.
66. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS ACROSS THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2020).
67. Jacey Fortin, Can Felons Vote? It Depends on the State, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/us/felony-voting-rights-law.html [https://perma.cc/
3QTF-BYM3].
68. Erik Eckholm, Kentucky Governor Restores Voting Rights to Thousands of
Felons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/us/kentuckygovernor-restores-voting-rights-to-thousands-of-felons.html [https://perma.cc/LPX8-WBH4].
“As an executive order, the new policy can be altered or scrapped by a future governor.”
Id.
69. Jonathan Bullington & Chris Kenning, Gov. Andy Beshear Restores Voting
Rights to More Than 140,000 Nonviolent Kentucky Felons, COURIER J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 3:41
PM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/ky-governor/2019/12/12/felonsright-vote-kentucky-restores-voting-rights-more-than-100000/4397887002/ [https://perma.cc/
4CB7-Q92X]. In Kentucky, unlike Florida, completion of sentence does not require payment
of fines, fees, and restitution, but does require completion of terms such as probation.
Mazzei & Wines, supra note 15. Consider the impact of this interpretation of the wording
“completion of sentence” on someone like Mr. Windham, who will be on probation for
a minimum of seven years and a maximum of life. Telephone Interview with John Windham,
supra note 3.
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year.70 Governor Beshear’s son, Governor Andy Beshear, reinstated his
father’s order on December 12, 2019,71 resulting in restoration of rights to
an estimated 178,390 of 312,000 Kentuckians previously barred from
voting due to a felony conviction.72 Similarly, in 2005, Iowan Governor
Tom Vilsack restored voting rights to all formerly convicted of a felony,
but Governor Terry Branstad reversed the executive order in 2011.73
Felon disenfranchisement may also have political consequences. Given
the high rates of felon disenfranchisement in Florida, which deprives more
people of the right to vote than any other state, studies in the aftermath of
the close 2000 Presidential race estimate that if ex-offenders who had
completed their sentences had been allowed to vote, Al Gore would have
been elected President of the United States rather than George Bush.74
70. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons, supra note 12. However, restoring
rights to convicted felons does not always split evenly along political lines. Louisville
Republican House Representative Jason Nemes is sponsoring a pending bill to restore all
civil rights, including gun ownership and jury service, to convicted felons five years after
completion of sentence. Chris Kenning, Kentucky Restored Voting Rights to 178,000 with
Felonies. That’s Not Far Enough, Advocates Say, COURIER J. (Jan. 28, 2021, 11:00 AM),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2021/01/28/kentucky-felon-voting-rightsmust-go-farther-advocates-say/4258930001/ [https://perma.cc/94GJ-6JU4]. For text of
the proposed amendment to Section 145 of the Kentucky State Constitution, pending at
time of publication, see H.R. 232, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021).
71. Bullington & Kenning, supra note 69. Kentucky Equal Justice Center attorney
Ben Carter criticized the partial restoration as politically motivated, commenting that “the
distinction between violent and non-violent felons is so frustrating, because it ignores a
fact that Gov. [Andy] Beshear knows very well – that the distinction has already been
made by our justice system,” adding “[t]hose convicted of violent felonies have served
more time in prison and on parole” than those convicted of non-violent felonies. Id.
Acknowledging bipartisan support in the Kentucky legislature for partial restoration of
felon voting rights, Republican House Speaker David Osborne expressed concerns about
the use of executive orders to effectuate a result that can only be permanently affixed by a
constitutional amendment approved by Kentucky voters. Id.
72. Kenning, supra note 70. The 2019 order reduced the percentage of the state
population barred from voting due to a felony conviction by more than half, where prior
to the order an estimated 9% of the state population was barred from voting because of a
felony conviction. Bullington & Kenning, supra note 69.
73. Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons, supra note 12.
74. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and
the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (2004). University
of Minnesota sociologist Chris Uggen determined that if “felons had the vote, Al Gore
would have likely won the popular vote by more than a million votes. In Florida alone,
Gore would have picked up 60,000-80,000 votes–enough to swamp the narrow victory
margin declared for George Bush.” Rebecca Perl, The Last Disenfranchised Class, NATION
(Nov. 6, 2003), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/last-disenfranchised-class/
[https://perma.cc/PXV9-T3CU]; see also Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic

947

ATKINSON (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/25/2022 3:21 PM

The variance of felon disenfranchisement laws from state to state
reflects the foundations of American federalism. And the variance, and
even politicization, of felon disenfranchisement is indisputably constitutional.
But there is a caveat––state felon disenfranchisement laws that have a
racially discriminatory effect cannot pass constitutional muster.75
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN STATE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE VOTER
QUALIFICATIONS AND FEDERAL PROHIBITIONS
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
The broad language of Article I, section 276 of the U.S. Constitution has
been interpreted to give states authority to determine voter qualifications.77
States traditionally have constitutional authority and wide latitude to set
voter qualifications.78 The Supreme Court is reluctant to impinge upon a
traditional area of state authority.79 However, the Reconstruction Amendments
were enacted for precisely that purpose: To bring state law in line with a

Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States,
67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 777, 792 (2002). Bush won Florida by only 537 votes, where 57% of
the white vote in Florida went to Bush but 93% of the Black vote in Florida went to Gore.
See Peter Wagner, Massachusetts Disenfranchises its Prisoners, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Nov. 30, 2000), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2000/11/30/mavote/ [https://perma.cc/
49KH-6BRB]. Where 11% of Florida registered voters were Black in 2000, Blacks
comprised an estimated 44% of 58,000 alleged felons listed on a “purge list” distributed
to county election supervisors to prevent convicted felons from voting. Ari Berman, How
the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter Disenfranchisement, NATION
(July 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-the-2000-election-inflorida-led-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenfranchisement/ [https://perma.cc/8FVA-EWS7].
An estimated 12,000 people on that list were incorrectly labeled felons and turned away
from the ballot box. Id.
75. Liles, supra note 35, at 618–21. An otherwise constitutional disenfranchisement
law is unconstitutional if violative of another provision of the constitution, such as equal
protection or the Fifteenth amendment. Id; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
76. See supra note 54.
77. Mai, supra note 37, at 21.
78. Id. “Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record are obvious examples
indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications
of voters.” Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 45 (1959) (citing
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345–47 (1890)) (upholding North Carolina literacy requirement
for voting).
79. Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority Over Elections, 99
B.U. L. REV. 317, 341 (2019). Courts have traditionally imposed limitations upon the
exercise of federal power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 318,
340. However, Congress has constitutional power under the Elections Clause to “police
state action . . . to protect the fundamental right to vote.” Id. at 318.

948

ATKINSON (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 933, 2021]

3/25/2022 3:21 PM

Racially Discriminatory Felon Disenfranchisement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

national program prohibiting slavery and its collateral consequences.80
The Reconstruction Amendments have always been at tension with state
rights.81 Constitutional laws may be found otherwise unconstitutional if
racially discriminatory.82
A. The Fifteenth Amendment and the VRA
The Fifteenth Amendment was the last of the three Reconstruction
Amendments and intended as the final death knell of slavery.83 On the
first day of the amendment’s consideration by the U.S. Senate, Senator
Stewart, explaining why Congress should pass the amendment, stated:
This amendment is a declaration to make all men without regard to race or color,
equal before the law. The arguments in favor of it are so numerous, so convincing,
that they carry conviction to every mind. The proposition itself has been recognized
by the good men of this nation; and it is important, as the new administration
enters upon the charge of the affairs of this country, that it should start on this
high and noble principle that all men are free and equal, that they are really equal
before the law. We cannot stop short of this. It must be done. It is the only measure
that will really abolish slavery. It is the only guarantee against peon laws and
against oppression. It is that guarantee which was put in the Constitution of the
United States originally, the guarantee that each man shall have a right to protect
his own liberty. It repudiates that arrogant, self-righteous assumption, that one
man can be charged with the liberties and destinies of another. You may put this
in the form of legislative enactment; you may empower Congress to legislate; you
may empower the States to legislate, and they will agitate the question. Let it be
made the immutable law of the land; let it be fixed; and then we shall have peace.
Until then there is no peace.84

This amendment did not confer the right to vote on anyone but prohibited
discrimination in voting based on race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.85 The promise to eradicate discriminatory barriers to the vote
80. Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm
[https://perma.cc/884Q-BEVL].
81. One of the first objections to consideration of the proposed Fifteenth Amendment
was the concern with “regulating the suffrage in a State,” which had been “left with the
people of the State . . . from the foundation of the Government to this time.” CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 542 (1869) (statement of Senator Dixon).
82. Liles, supra note 35, at 621.
83. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 668 (1869).
84. Id.
85. Megan Bailey, The Fifteenth Amendment, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.
gov/articles/the-fifteenth-amendment.htm [https://perma.cc/3WSJ-G74K]; see also Everette
Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-1877, 28 J.S. HIST. 202, 204 (1962)
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was declaratory, but in practice had no teeth.86 States continued to enact
laws to frustrate and dilute the African American vote, undermining the
efficacy of the Fifteenth Amendment’s declaration with poll taxes, grandfather
clauses, property requirements, and literacy tests.87 African Americans
were prevented from voting by intimidation and violence.88
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted by Congress to coursecorrect this failure of states and courts89 to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.90
The Act’s enactment was authorized by section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment itself, which provides: “The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”91 Initially, the phrasing of
section 2 of the VRA mirrored the Fifteenth Amendment.92 Where the
Fifteenth Amendment provided in section 1 that “the right of citizens of

(“The Fifteenth Amendment . . . did not grant the Negro the right to vote; it merely outlawed
the use of race as a test for voting.”).
86.
For example, many southern states were able to amend their state constitutions
following Reconstruction to restrict access to voting. See Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire,
The Voting Rights Act and the Racial Gap in Lost Votes, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 27–28
(2006).
87. Id.
88. Swinney, supra note 85, at 202. Congressional efforts to thwart the use of “force,
bribery, threats, and intimidation” through three acts passed between 1870 and 1871,
known as the Enforcement Acts, met limited success as state and local authorities declined
cooperation and local communities stalled efforts to prosecute violations. Id. at 202–03,
209–11.
89. Stephanie N. Kang, Restoring the Fifteenth Amendment: The Constitutional
Right to an Undiluted Vote, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1392, 1400 (explaining that the VRA was
a response to the “widespread practice of state disenfranchisement and acts of violence
toward voting rights activists”); see also ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION : THE F EDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS,
1866–1876, at 83–84, 89 (2005). Initial prosecutions under the Enforcement Acts were
highly effective. Id. at 83–84. However, by 1873, “the Justice Department completely
abandoned civil rights enforcement,” declining to prosecute cases unless the crime was
both a “fragrant violation of the law and the probability of conviction was strong.” Id. at
89.
90. History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.
justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/648U-5L3K] (noting
the language of the VRA “closely followed the language of the 15th Amendment” and
“contained special enforcement provisions targeted at those areas of the country where
Congress believed the potential for discrimination to be the greatest”). Promoting the
VRA’s adoption, the Senate Judiciary Committee wrote: “We all recognize the necessity
to eradicate once and for all the chronic system of racial discrimination which has for so
long excluded so many citizens from the electorate because of the color of their skins,
contrary to the explicit command of the 15th amendment.” Kang, supra note 89, at 1400
(citing S. Rep. No. 89-162, pt. 3, at 2 (1965)).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
92. History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 90; see also Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973–1973aa-6) (current version at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10314).
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the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude,”93 the VRA as enacted in 196594 stated: “No voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”95
To be clear, section 2 does not mention felon disenfranchisement.
Before the application of section 2 to felon disenfranchisement challenges,
plaintiffs were using section 2 to challenge election districting schemes on
grounds of vote dilution.96
B. Vote Dilution vs. Vote Denial
Section 2 provides a remedy for claims of vote denial or vote dilution.97
Vote denial affects participation and refers to practices that bar people
from registering to vote or voting at all.98 Vote dilution affects representation
and refers to practices that diminish a group’s political influence.99 Far
more cases have been brought under vote dilution claims than vote denial
claims,100 and the Supreme Court has not decided a vote denial case under
the “results” language of section 2.101 “The legislative history of the 1982
amendments thus shows that Congress was almost exclusively focused on
vote dilution claims,”102 but the language in the Senate Report prohibiting
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
94. The VRA’s efficacy was immediate. Within four years, the percentage of African
Americans registered to vote skyrocketed from 6.7% to 66.5% in Mississippi, 19.3% to
61.3% in Alabama, and 27.4% to 60.4% in Georgia, and 31.6 to 60.8% in Louisiana.
ALEXANDER, supra note 58, at 38.
95. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2.
96. See Montano v. Suffolk Cnty. Legis., 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(“[Section 2] bars the enactment of election districts which minimize or cancel out the
voting strength of minorities . . . .”) (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1969)).
97. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 442 (2015).
98. Id.
99. Id. For example, redistricting plans that “either weaken or keep minorities’
voting strength weak.” Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2009).
100. Tokaji, supra note 97.
101. Id. at 445. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the “results” language.
102. Simmons, 575 F.3d at 40 (quoting Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial:
Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 707 (2006)).
See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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“all voting rights discrimination” that “result[s] in the denial of equal
access to any phase of the electoral process for minority group members”103
affirms the applicability of the VRA to vote denial cases.
To combat concerns that the results test104 would be understood to
mandate proportional representation, the 1982 amendments added qualifying
language in section (b):
A violation of [§ 2] is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by [§ 2] in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance
which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.105

After the 1982 amendments, Thornburg v. Gingles106 established the test
for vote dilution claims, by which plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions107
and then show deprivation of an opportunity to participate in the political
process by electing chosen representatives in the “totality of the
circumstances.”108 Gingles also illuminated the essence of a section 2
claim: “[T]hat a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with
social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities
enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”109
This essence illuminates the principle which should also guide the test for
whether felon disenfranchisement laws constitute vote denial of African
Americans as a protected class in violation of section 2.110

103. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982).
104. See infra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.
105. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
106. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
107. Tokaji, supra note 97, at 445 (summarizing the Gingles preconditions: “(1) the
minority group must be sufficiently ‘large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district’”; (2) the group must be ‘politically cohesive’; and (3) there
must be racial bloc voting by whites, so as to defeat minority candidates (quoting Thornburg,
478 U.S. at 50–51)).
108. Id. at 446.
109. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
110. In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021), the
majority (written by Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas,
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) found, “equal openness [is] the touchstone.” 141 S. Ct.
at 2338. Maybe so, but evaluating the openness to which the statute refers involves analysis of,
among other factors—including data of statistical significance—how the voting practice
or qualification interacts with social and historical conditions to determine whether there
is causation between the practice and impaired opportunity to vote on account of race.
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IV. DISPARATE IMPACT & THE POWER OF A VRA CHALLENGE: WHERE
A SECTION 2 CHALLENGE CAN ACCOMPLISH WHAT
FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES COULD NOT
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments ban disparate treatment,
marked by intent, on the basis of race, but not disparate impact. 111
Disparate impact is “an adverse, disproportionate impact [that] is brought
about by decision making criteria or practices that operate to harm
individuals on the basis of a protected status characteristic,”112 such as
race. Disparate impact is often best discernable through evidence of
statistical disparities.113 However, courts have shown increasing skepticism
of reliance on statistical analysis without more, 114 making proof of a
causal connection between a policy or law and discriminatory result
critical yet challenging to prove.115
111. Roger Clegg & Hans A. von Spakovsky, “Disparate Impact” and Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, 85 MISS. L.J. 1357, 1361 (2016).
112. Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus
Impact, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1473 (2005).
113. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination,
84 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2009) (discussing disparate impact claims under Title VII, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Faith Housing
Act, and claims brought under state antidiscrimination laws). “Statistics are generally
plaintiffs’ primary evidence in establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.”
Id.
114. As noted in the state of Massachusetts’ opposition brief to Petitioner’s Writ of
Certiorari, at least five circuit courts have found statistical evidence of disparity alone
“insufficient as a matter of law to establish a VRA § 2 claim of vote denial on account of
race.” See Brief in Opposition at 13–14, Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (2009) (No. 09920) (first citing Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d
586, 588–89, 595–96 (9th Cir. 1997); then citing Ortiz v. City of Phila. Off. of the City
Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 307–15 (3d Cir. 1994); then citing Salas
v. Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992); then citing Irby v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1358–59 (4th Cir. 1989); and then citing Wesley v.
Collins, 791 F.2d 1260–62 (6th Cir. 1986)). “These cases stand for the principle that a bare
statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not satisfy the § 2
‘results’ inquiry.’” Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595. “[T]here must be some causal connection
between the challenged electoral practice and the alleged [racial] discrimination that
results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote.” Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 310.
115. Because the totality of the circumstances is the appropriate test, see infra notes
222–23 and accompanying text, disparate impact will not be determinative in every case,
but it may be determinative in a case in which the evidence presented is so compelling, so
statistically significant, that disparate impact is undeniable. While perfectly acceptable to
give weight to some factors more than others, no general rule can be established as to
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Initially, section 2 challenges required only proof of a discriminatory
effect, but in 1980 the Supreme Court required plaintiffs to also prove
discriminatory intent, like Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims.116
The Court’s decision prompted Congress to swiftly take legislative action
to recraft the language and effect of the VRA.117 The 1982 amendments
removed the intent requirement imposed by the Court’s interpretation of
section 2 to read:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizens of the
United States to vote on account of race or color.118

Now, unlike an equal protection challenge,119 the VRA does not require
plaintiffs to prove that the “contested electoral mechanism was
intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory
purpose.”120 Instead, the VRA prohibits disparate impact resulting from
a racially disproportionate result or effect.121 This focus on discriminatory
which factors should have the greatest weight. The Brnovich decision should not be read
to destroy the possibility that disparate impact data can win a section 2 case, because the
totality of the circumstances test must inherently cleave to the facts of each specific case.
Put differently, because each case must receive individual consideration in the totality of
the circumstances, Brnovich has limited precedential value except to exceptionally analogous
cases. See infra note 123.
116. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61, 67 (1980) (finding plaintiff’s
Voting Rights section 2 claim no different from the Fifteenth Amendment claim where the
court’s review of legislative history led the court to agree with Senator Dirksen’s
characterization of section 2 during Senate hearings as “almost a rephrasing of the 15th
Amendment”), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a),
as recognized in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Thornburg provided the
Supreme Court’s first occasion to construe the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments
to section 2. See generally Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30.
117. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 35 (“The amendment was largely in response to this
Court’s plurality opinion in Mobile . . . .”).
118. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (emphasis added).
119. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 56 (“[R]acially discriminatory motivation is a necessary
ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation” and the Equal Protection Clause is only
violated if there is “purposeful discrimination”); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222, 227–28 (1985) (“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it
results in a racially disproportionate impact . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause” (quoting Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977))).
120. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 35.
121. Clegg & Spakovsky, supra note 111, at 1361; see also Brnovich v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (2021). Although the Supreme Court found the
disparity in Brnovich insignificant and insufficient to establish disparate impact under
section 2, see Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2348, the plaintiffs in Brnovich at least had the
opportunity to present their case and evidence of disparate impact. Convicted felons
currently have no such luxury—no nationally recognized cause of action. Once section 2
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effect, otherwise known as the “results test,” is the power behind the
VRA.122

VRA challenges are recognized for individuals with prior felony conviction(s), as this
Comment urges, every measure should be taken to identify how plaintiffs can, and should,
present evidence of disparate impact to win section 2 cases. Simply put, once the Court
heeds the call of this Comment, plaintiffs need a blueprint to corral evidence sufficient to
make a prima facie case of disparate impact. Developing a blueprint to win cases will not
be easy. Even the two circuits that recognize section 2 challenges to state felon disenfranchisement
laws have not yet recognized a successful case of proven disparate impact. But the absence
of a success in jurisdictions that recognize section 2 challenges in this context cannot and
should not be understood to diminish the importance of providing the opportunity for a
challenge to be brought in the event disparate impact can be proven; after all, “the
demographics and political geography of States vary widely and Section 2’s application
depends upon place-specific facts.” Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2364 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
122. See Frank R. Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 716 (1983) (“The new language of
section 2 reinvigorates efforts of minority Americans to overcome discriminatory barriers
to a meaningful vote.”). However, the Supreme Court has made winning disparate impact
claims under the VRA difficult. A majority of the current Court are traditionalist justices,
and traditionalists attempt to restrict the disparate impact theory of liability because they
strongly believe that, with the end of legalized racial discrimination (Jim Crow) in the
early 1970s, race no longer matters in our society, and fear this theory of liability stokes
racial division by giving plaintiffs a license to go fishing for and exaggerate racism where
none exists. See ROY L. BROOKS , THE R ACIAL GLASS C EILING : S UBORDINATION IN
AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE 39 (2017) (discussing the concept of “traditionalism”); see
also id. at 51–53 (discussing traditionalist take on Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658
(2009), where the traditionalist majority rejects the city’s attempt to remedy the disparate
impact of its test for firefighter promotions); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Comty. Affs. v.
Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U. S. 519, 558 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (opining that disparate
impact claims should not be cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) notwithstanding the
FHA’s results-oriented language and the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title
VII and ADEA). Brnovich continues the conservative assault on disparate impact.
Although the racial disparity at issue in this case may have been small, that is no reason to
suggest that small racial disparities are not actionable under the VRA. Brnovich, 141 S.
Ct at 2345 (“The District Court found that among the counties that reported out-of-precinct
ballots in the 2016 general election, roughly 99% of Hispanic voters, 99% of AfricanAmerican voters, and 99% of Native American voters who voted on election day cast their
ballots in the right precinct, while roughly 99.5% of non-minority voters did so.” (citing
Democratic Nat’l Comm. V. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824, 872 (2018))). Justice Kagan
correctly notes in dissent what may appear a “smallish number” of votes “can matter” for
purposes of section 2 because “elections are often fought and won at the margins” and “a
small group of voters” can “influence the outcome of an election.” Id. at 2367. My
sincerest thanks to Earl Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, Roy Brooks, for his
substantial contributions to the development of this footnote and his pioneering work in
the area of critical process in jurisprudence.
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A. Racially Discriminatory Effect of Felon Disenfranchisement Statutes
In some communities, the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement
has an effect contrary to the intent of the Fifteenth Amendment and the
VRA. For example, states with lifetime disqualification laws like Alabama
and Florida disenfranchise nearly a third of the Black male population,
and nearly a quarter are barred from voting in Iowa, Mississippi, Virginia,
and Wyoming.123 As of 2020, at a rate more than four times that of nonAfrican Americans, one in every sixteen Black adults nationwide could
not vote as the result of a felony conviction,124 and in Florida, Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Virginia, the number of Black adults disenfranchised from
a felony conviction was greater than one in seven.125 The proportions are
even higher for Black men: In 2010, one-third126 of Black men were estimated
to have felony convictions; an increase from 6%127 in 1980.128 The waters
are muddied by the complexity of factors resulting in this disparity––
namely, racial discrimination along every point of the criminal justice
system, from arrests and charging129 to sentencing.130

123. Karlan, supra note 74, at 1157.
124. CHUNG, supra note 56, at 2.
125. Id.
126. Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of
People with Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1807
(2017). Compare with about 12% for all adult men in the same year. Id.
127. Id. Compare with 2% for all adult men in 1980 and 5.6% in 2010. Id.
128. Id. Significantly, just because plaintiffs lost in Brnovich does not mean that
felon plaintiffs will also be unable to prove disparate impact under the method employed
by the majority: in fact, given such disproportionally outrageous percentages of the general
population of black voters disenfranchised relative to white voters—far beyond the 1-2%
disparity dismissed as insignificant by the Brnovich majority—formerly convicted felon
plaintiffs may be able to present compelling evidence of statistical disparity under either
the majority’s test, the dissent’s test, or both. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,
141 S. Ct. 2321, 2344–45 (2021).
129. See generally Dominique Camm, Reversing the Standard: The Difficulty in Proving
Selective Prosecution, 31 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 93 (2008) (discussing the near impossibility
of proving discriminatory intent in selective prosecution on the basis of race).
130. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court acknowledged the systemic racism
in the criminal justice system and, as usual, motioned to the legislature as the appropriate
venue to effectuate change. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–18 (1987) (acknowledging
the veracity of the Baldus report evidencing racial disparity in sentencing yet finding
disparities in sentencing to be an inevitable part of our criminal justice system). For an
example of extreme racial disparity in arrests and sentencing, see also COUNCIL ON CRIME
& JUST., AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (documenting
racial disparity in Hennepin County in Minnesota from 1999 to 2001). The report found
that in 2000, although only 3.5% of the state’s population was African American, 37.2%
of prisoners were African American, and that “African Americans [were] 21 times more
likely to be arrested for violent crimes than whites.” Id. at 1.
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Although felon disenfranchisement laws have a long history in the
Western World131 and predated Reconstruction, 132 post-Reconstruction
southern states tailored disenfranchisement laws to target crimes believed
to be most committed by the Black population for the purpose of undermining
the Black vote.133 Today, “more Black men are disqualified [from voting]
by the operation of criminal disenfranchisement laws than were actually
enfranchised by the passage of the Fifteenth amendment.”134
B. Discriminatory Intent vs. Discriminatory Effect
The discriminatory intent requirement has made equal protection and
Fifteenth Amendment challenges to felon disenfranchisement nearly impossible
to prove.135 Absent explicit statements evincing discriminatory intent,
most cases fail to win equal protection challenges in a criminal context.136
Hunter v. Underwood was the rare case where plaintiff felons succeeded
not only in showing a racially discriminatory effect, but discriminatory
intent within the state’s disenfranchisement law.137 In the only Supreme
131. Christina Beeler, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Paying and Re-Paying a
Debt to Society, 21 U. P A. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1076 (2019). “Civil death,” the revocation
of civil rights such as the right to vote from citizens who committed crimes, dates back to
ancient Greece. Id. at 1076; see also infra notes 41–43.
132. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974) (“[A]t the time of the
adoption of the [Fourteenth] Amendment, 29 States had provisions in their constitutions
which prohibited, or authorized the legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by
persons convicted of felonies or infamous crimes.”).
133. CHUNG, supra note 56, at 3.
134. Karlan, supra note 74, at 1157 & n.48 (“According to the 1870 census, there
were approximately 1,083,484 black men in the United States over the age of 20 . . . Given
then-existing restrictions on the franchise (e.g., property holding and poll tax requirements,
pauper exclusions, and other disqualifications), some proportion of these men would have
been ineligible to vote even after the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited racial discrimination in
the franchise and thus the total number of black men sets an upper boundary on the number
of potential black voters.” (internal citations omitted)).
135. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 280 (finding “exceptionally clear proof” is required
before court will find discriminatory intent).
136. Id. (finding general statistics, without more, is insufficient to prove discriminatory
intent). See generally Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept
Statistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—and Some Pathways
for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269 (2018) (discussing restriction of the use of statistics
to prove discriminatory purpose and the reticence of the judiciary to consider social
science evidence of bias in the criminal justice system).
137. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (“The delegates to the allwhite [Alabama State constitutional] convention were not secretive about their purpose.
John B. Knox, president of the convention, stated in his opening address: ‘And what is it
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Court case to date to address felon disenfranchisement aside from Richardson,
and by unanimous decision, the Court struck down Alabama’s felon
disenfranchisement provision. 138 For the first time, 139 the Court had
occasion to consider whether the felon disenfranchisement provision,
despite being presumptively constitutional, was nonetheless unconstitutional
as a racially discriminatory violation of equal protection.140 Although
Article VIII, § 182, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901—providing for
the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of certain enumerated
felonies and misdemeanors, including “any . . . crime involving moral
turpitude” —was racially neutral on its face, the court of appeals found
the evidence of discriminatory impact indisputable.141 The enumerated
crimes included, inter alia, vagrancy, adultery, and wife beating––crimes
thought to be more commonly committed by Blacks—as well as “crimes
of moral turpitude.”142

that we want to do? Why it is within the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution, to
establish white supremacy in this State.’” (quoting 1 O FFICIAL P ROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, MAY 21, 1901 TO SEPTEMBER
3, 1901, at 8 (1901))).
138. Nathan P. Litwin, Defending an Unjust System: How Johnson v. Bush Upheld
Felon Disenfranchisement and Perpetuated Voter Inequality in Florida, 3 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 236, 254 (2003) (“The Alabama law at issue in Hunter originally had clear racial
motivation behind its enactment. The Alabama legislature had removed the more blatantly
discriminatory sections . . . [and] argued that the removal of these discriminatory sections
sufficiently changed the law to make the remaining provisions valid. ”) However, the
Supreme Court found that “despite the removal of the worst provisions of the original law,
Alabama’s disenfranchisement law still contained original language enacted with discriminatory
intent,” and despite being “facially neutral,” was invalid “because the language had been
enacted with discriminatory intent.” Id.
139. In Richardson, the Court did not have occasion to rule on allegations of
intentional discrimination because the California Supreme Court had not made a finding
on that issue. Liles, supra note 35, at 620. Lower courts subsequently found that Richardson
left open the possibility that intentional racial discrimination could cause an otherwise
constitutional law to be unconstitutional. Id.
140. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 (“We are confident that § 2 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending the
enactment and operation of [the Alabama constitutional provision providing for felon
disenfranchisement] which otherwise violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
141. Id. at 227 (“The registrars’ expert estimated that by January 1903 section 182
had disfranchised approximately ten times as many Blacks as whites. This disparate effect
persists today. In Jefferson and Montgomery Counties Blacks are by even the most modest
estimates at least 1.7 times as likely as whites to suffer disfranchisement under section 182
for the commission of nonprison offenses.” (quoting Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614,
620 (11th Cir. 1984))).
142. Id. at 226–27 (citing Underwood, 730 F.2d at 620 n.13) (finding of fact made
by the Eleventh Circuit noted that more serious crimes more commonly committed by
whites fell outside the scope of the disenfranchisement law while less serious offenses fell
under the broad category “crimes involving moral turpitude”).
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Acknowledging that “proving the motivation behind official action is
often a problematic undertaking,” 143 the Supreme Court nevertheless
agreed with the court of appeals that discriminating against Blacks was a
motivating factor for the provision.144 Hunter affirmed a presumptively
constitutional felon disenfranchisement law is unconstitutional if violative
of equal protection.145
The Hunter victory was short-lived. Just over ten years later in 1996,
Alabama passed an amendment to the state constitution that essentially
duplicated the law denying the right to vote to individuals convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude previously struck down by the Supreme
Court in Hunter on equal protections grounds.146 Felons brought a class
action challenging the statutory disenfranchisement scheme.147 The district
court found that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Governor
of the State of Florida148 foreclosed the plaintiffs’ claim under section 2
of the VRA, and that was that; the case ended there.149
The result in Thompson v. Alabama warns of the inadequacy of
constitutional challenges to root out felon disenfranchisement statutes
with a racially discriminatory effect. Plaintiffs in the circuits that fail to
recognize the legitimacy of a VRA challenge are without a remedy when
the disenfranchisement statutes have a racially discriminatory effect,
because a state can carefully and identically reenact a statute found to have
a racially discriminatory effect as long as the state carefully maneuvers to
avoid the appearance of any discriminatory intent. 150 In other words,

143. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228 (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982)).
144. Id. at 229. The Court found unconvincing the state’s argument that the purpose
behind the section was to disenfranchise poor whites as well as Blacks; such dual purpose
did not dilute the purpose of the provision to discriminate against Blacks. Id. at 230.
145. Id. at 227–28 (“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because
it results in a racially disproportionate impact . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (quoting Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977))).
146. Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
147. See, e.g., id.
148. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
149. Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 1324–25. This outcome—finding an actionable
claim for intentional discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment but not under the VRA—is ironic given that the
standards for a VRA claim are lower. Id.
150. See id. at 1325 (“[P]laintiffs bringing a section 2 VRA challenge to a felon
disenfranchisement law based on the operation of a state’s criminal justice system must at
least show that the criminal justice system is infected by intentional discrimination or that
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without the threat of a VRA challenge, a state can white-wash the motivations
for enacting its felon disenfranchisement statutes, which will survive
despite having a discriminatory effect.151 This result mocks the aims of the
Fifteenth Amendment: Not because the Fifteenth Amendment contemplated
felons voting, but because in some communities, felon disenfranchisement laws
are a de facto abridgement or denial of the right to vote on account of
race.152 It is for precisely this reason that the VRA, which requires proof
of a discriminatory result without proof of discriminatory intent, is crucial
to striking down discriminatory felon disenfranchisement laws that would
otherwise stand.153 Regardless of the standard it ultimately adopts for a
VRA challenge, the Supreme Court should overrule the decisions causing
the perverse result embodied in Thompson.
V. STATUS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Courts are split as to whether the VRA is even a viable challenge to
state felon disenfranchisement laws in the first place.154 Only the Sixth
and Ninth circuits acknowledge the validity of a section 2 challenge,155
while the First, Second, and Eleventh circuits have categorically rejected
section 2 challenges.156 Despite recognizing section 2 challenges, neither
the Sixth nor Ninth circuit has found a state felon disenfranchisement law
actually in violation of section 2.157

the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent.” (quoting Farrakhan III,
623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010)).
151. See id. at 1321 (noting that the Supreme Court’s two-step procedure for analyzing
whether a disenfranchisement law violates the Equal Protection Clause permits states to
defend a discriminatory intent so long as it demonstrates “that the law would have been
enacted without” such intent).
152. In general, the Alabama law at issue in Thompson was de facto abridgement of
the right to vote in that it barred any individual who committed a felony involving moral
turpitude, and as already shown, these laws targeted Black men. See generally id. at 1316;
sources cited supra notes 129–31, 139.
153. See id. at 1324 n.5 (discussing Congress’s prior amendments to the VRA in
response to case law).
154. Id. at 1325 (citing cases that demonstrate the different holdings courts have
reached when deciding a VRA challenge to a state disenfranchisement law).
155. See generally Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986); Farrakhan v.
Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
156. See sources cited infra note 165.
157. See Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262–63; Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1022.
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A. Wesley v. Collins: Recognizing the Validity of a Section 2 Challenge
to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the Right Case
The Sixth Circuit in Wesley v. Collins158 was the first federal court of
appeal to address the intersection of felon disenfranchisement and a
section 2 challenge.159 The district court granted the state’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that Tennessee’s disenfranchisement of
felons did not result in an unlawful dilution of the Black vote in violation
of the VRA.160 The circuit court affirmed, finding the Tennessee felon
disenfranchisement law did not violate the VRA, but only because the
facts did not support the claim—not because the challenge could not proceed
legally.161 This case recognized the validity of the VRA challenge and its
“totality of the circumstances” test under the Senate Factors,162 but held that
the Tennessee statute did not violate section 2 because: (1) The state has a
compelling rationale for disenfranchising individuals with certain convictions
and such laws are constitutional, and (2) the law does not disenfranchise
on account of race or a protected class; rather, it is an individual’s choice
to commit the act that resulted in the loss of voting rights. 163 However,
the Sixth Circuit left open the possibility a VRA challenge could strike down
the state’s felon disenfranchisement statutes in the right case. Nevertheless,

158. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1255.
159. Lauren Handelsman, Giving the Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875,
1898–99 (2005).
160. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1257 (“The district court granted defendants’ motion concluding
that Tennessee’s disenfranchisement of felons did not result in an unlawful dilution of the
black vote in violation of the Voting Rights Act.”).
161. Id. at 1262 (“For these reasons, this court concludes that the disproportionate
impact suffered by black Tennesseans does not ‘result’ from the state’s qualification of the
right to vote on the account of race or color and thus the Tennessee Act does not violate
the Voting Rights Act.”).
162. Id. at 1259–60. In Brnovich, the majority acknowledged the case addressed the
particular facts before it, “declin[ing] . . . to announce a test to govern all VRA § 2 claims
involving rules, like those at issue [in Brnovich], that specify the time, place, or manner
for casting ballots.” Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2336 (2021).
So, although that majority rejected the Senate Factors for use in its analysis of the two
specific Arizona time, place, and manner restrictions at issue, the Court should extend the
traditional Senate Factors to the analysis of felon disenfranchisement section 2 challenges,
rather than the contrived five factor test it proffered in Brnovich. After all, the Court
acknowledged the “‘Senate’ factors grew out of and were designed for use in vote-dilution
cases.” Id. at 2340.
163. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1261–62.
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no state statute has yet been found to violate section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.164
B. First, Second, and Eleventh Circuit Categorical Rejection of Section
2 Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
Under the Clear Statement Rule
In the wake of Collins, three circuit courts declined to permit VRA
challenges to state felon disenfranchisement laws.165 All have done so on
the same basis: The clear statement rule of statutory interpretation.166 A
shockingly simplistic tool, the clear statement rule requires Congress to
clearly state its intent when creating laws that could interfere with
authority traditionally left to the states.167 The Court has increasingly used
the clear statement rule to navigate the limits of Congress’s legislative
authority when in tension with state sovereignty.168 In the context of felon
disenfranchisement, these circuits have simplified the analysis down to
the absence of a clear statement from Congress to find that protection
under the VRA does not extend to felons because if Congress had intended
it to, it would have said so.

164. Liles, supra note 35, at 625.
165. See, e.g., Baker v. Pataki (Baker III), 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st
Cir. 2009).
166. The clear statement rule is also referred to as the plain statement rule. See
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (“This plain statement rule is nothing more
than an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our
constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”). “If
Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.’” Id. at 460–61 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
167. Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of
States, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1959 (1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has increasingly
relied upon clear statement rules in determining whether federal legislation applies to state
governments.”). However, the rule “operate[s] to foreclose a particular interpretation of a
statute even though consideration of the legislative text alone—its language and structure
—might point to a different meaning than the one dictated by the rule.” Id. In other words,
the clear statement rule serves as an “initial presumption[] that erect[s] potential barriers
to the straightforward effectuation of legislative intent.” Id.
168. See id.
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1. Baker v. Pataki: Second Circuit Rejects Section 2
Challenge Absent Clear Statement
Of all circuit courts, the Second Circuit had the first occasion to address
application of the VRA in this context.169 The plaintiffs in Baker v.
Cuomo170 appealed the Southern District of New York’s holding that the
VRA did not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws.171 Although the
Second Circuit initially ruled the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity
to submit evidence that the law had a disproportionate racial impact
violative of the VRA,172 on rehearing, the Second Circuit split in a five to
five vote en banc regarding the validity of a VRA challenge.173 The tie
affirmed the lower court decision declining to apply the VRA to felon
disenfranchisement, reasoning that doing so “would raise serious constitutional
questions regarding the scope of Congress’ authority to enforce the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments . . . [by altering] the ‘usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal government’”174 and because it was
“not unmistakably clear” that “Congress intended [the “results” test] be
applicable to felon disenfranchisement statutes.”175 Four other judges joined
Judge Wilfred Feinberg in criticizing the application of the clear statement
rule as improper because the Reconstruction Amendments “fundamentally
altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution”
and “[t]he Civil War Amendments were specifically designed as an
expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty.”176
Having failed to definitely resolve the issue of section 2 applicability in
this split en banc decision,177 the Second Circuit concluded in another en
banc decision a decade later that Congress did not intend the VRA to apply
to felon disenfranchisement statutes.178 Absent clear intent from Congress,
the court held application of the VRA in the felon disenfranchisement

169. Baker v. Cuomo (Baker I), 842 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
170. Id. at 718–19.
171. Baker III, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996).
172. Baker v. Cuomo (Baker II), 58 F.3d 814, 824 (2d Cir. 1995).
173. Baker III, 85 F.3d. at 921.
174. Id. at 922 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 938 (first quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59
(1996); and then quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)).
177. The ten judges sitting en banc were evenly divided as to the merits of the case.
Id. at 921.
178. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 305 (2d Cir. 2006).
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context would inappropriately alter the balance between state and federal
government.179
2. Johnson v. Governor of Florida: Eleventh Circuit Rejects Section 2
Challenge Absent Clear Statement
The Eleventh Circuit also heavily relied on the clear statement rule.180
In Johnson v. Bush,181 plaintiffs, convicted felons, initiated a class action
against the state clemency board and Governor Jeb Bush alleging the
permanent felony disenfranchisement provisions in the state’s constitution
and statutes denied plaintiffs voting rights on account of race in violation
of section 2 of the VRA.182 The lower court granted defendant’s motion
for summary judgment183 and the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded
the vote denial claims,184 but the Eleventh Circuit in an en banc decision
vacated the reversal, affirming summary judgment,185 and effectively held
the VRA did not apply to felony disenfranchisement laws.186 The court
summarily rejected a VRA challenge on the grounds the legislative history
of section 2 showed no indication that Congress intended for its provisions
and protections to apply to felons.187

179. Id. at 310 (recognizing that “this case poses a complex and difficult question
that, absent Congressional clarification, will only be definitively resolved by the Supreme
Court”).
180. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005) (“It is a
long-standing rule of statutory interpretation that federal courts should not construe a
statute to create a constitutional question unless there is a clear statement from Congress
endorsing this understanding.”). In this case, the constitutional question being an
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act as limiting the right of the states under section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to deny the right to vote to convicted felons. Id. at 1229.
181. Johnson v. Bush, No. 00-3542-CIV-KING, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27468 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 29, 2001).
182. Id. at *6–7. In this unreported opinion, Judge King found that the plaintiff
felons had “satisfied the minimal pleading requirements” to survive a motion to dismiss
and to proceed with claims of violations of the VRA, in addition to the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at *7–8. Then, just over a year and a half later, the defendant’s
motion for summary judgement was granted. See Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333,
1343–44 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
183. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1343–44.
184. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003).
185. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005).
186. Id. at 1234. “Felon disenfranchisement laws are unlike other voting qualifications.
These laws are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and are a punitive device stemming
from criminal law.” Id. at 1228 (footnote omitted).
187. Id. at 1233–34. “Instead of a clear statement from Congress indicating that the
plaintiffs’ interpretation is correct, the legislative history indicates just the opposite—that
Congress never intended the Voting Rights Act to reach felon disenfranchisement provisions.”
Id. at 1232.
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3. Simmons v. Galvin: First Circuit Rejects Section 2
Challenge Absent Clear Statement
The First Circuit’s subsequent decision in Simmons v. Galvin adopted
the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning to categorically bar the application of
section 2 to felon disenfranchisement laws.188 In 2001, several incarcerated
felons in state custody challenged a Massachusetts law disqualifying
currently incarcerated felons189 from voting in certain elections, claiming
that the disenfranchisement provisions violated section 2 of the VRA
because the percentage of imprisoned felons who are Hispanic or African–
American was greater than the percentages of those groups in the population
of the state.190 Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that past practices in the
Massachusetts criminal justice system 191 produced inmate populations
which, in combination with the disqualification of inmates imprisoned for
felonies, resulted in disproportionate disqualification of minorities from
voting.192 The court once again relied on the absence of a clear statement
188. Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (“We think it clear from
the language, history, and context of the VRA that Congress never intended § 2 to prohibit
the states from disenfranchising currently incarcerated felons.”).
189. Prior to 2000, Massachusetts permitted incarcerated felons to vote, like its sister
states Maine and Vermont. Peter Wagner, Massachusetts Disenfranchises its Prisoners,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 30, 2000), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2000/
11/30/mavote/ [https://perma.cc/TA9G-GBQU]. On November 7, 2000, 60% of voters
passed a constitutional amendment to prohibit incarcerated felons from voting in elections
governed by the state constitution. Id.; see also Timeline of Massachusetts Incarcerated
Voting Rights, EMANCIPATION INITIATIVE, https://emancipationinitiative.org/ballots-overbars/returning-the-right-to-vote/ [https://perma.cc/T7GH-2S4U].
190. Simmons, 575 F.3d at 26. “This is a claim based purely on the allegation that
Article 120 has a disparate impact on minorities by disqualifying from voting imprisoned
felons.” Id. at 29.
191. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged, “There is a race-based disparity in the conviction rate
and sentence type in both the State of Massachusetts and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts”
and that “African–Americans and Hispanic–Americans make up a disproportionate percentage
of the approximately 12,000 or more persons, incarcerated in the State of Massachusetts
[and] have been historically and systematically discriminated against by and within the
criminal justice system of the State of Massachusetts and the Commonwealth” because
“African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans are more likely than whites to be imprisoned for
the commission of the same offense [and] more likely than white to be denied parole for
conviction of the same offense.” Complaint at 8–9, Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st
Cir. 2009) (No. 1:01-CV-11040-MLW).
192. Id. The Petitioners “made no allegation” that Massachusetts “acted with racially
discriminatory intent or purpose,” did not claim that “Massachusetts has any history
of using laws, rules, practices, tests or devices to restrict, impede, or discourage voting by
racial minorities,” and did not allege that Massachusetts disenfranchised certain “felonies
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from Congress applying the VRA to felon disenfranchisement and traditional
state power to set voting eligibility criteria only limited by certain federal
restrictions.193
C. Rejection of the Clear Statement Rule: Ninth Circuit Permits Section
2 Challenges to State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
Under the Totality of the Circumstances
The Ninth Circuit properly interpreted the plain meaning of section 2 of
the VRA, rejected a clear statement analysis, and embraced the VRArecommended totality of the circumstances test.194 This divergence from
the clear statement analysis arose in the Eastern District of Washington
when plaintiffs,195 all convicted of felonies, challenged Washington’s felon
disenfranchisement scheme as improper race-based vote denial in violation
of section 2 of the VRA.196 The district court correctly found the clear
statement rule followed by other jurisdictions does not apply to the VRA.197
Instead, the court found that section 2 of the VRA is applicable to a felon
disenfranchisement law with a racially discriminatory effect because the
plain meaning of the VRA itself prohibits any voting qualification, test, or
device that denies the vote on the basis of race, and “felon disenfranchisement is
a voting device.”198 Despite recognizing Washington’s felon disenfranchisement
scheme disproportionately discriminated against minorities, including African
Americans, the district court found the cause of the disparate impact
that had higher conviction rates for minorities than for whites.” Brief in Opposition at 2,
Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (2009). Rather, the Petitioners’ claim was one of
“disparate impact on minorities by disqualifying from voting imprisoned felons.” Id.
Their claim rested principally upon the statistical reality that Hispanic and African Americans
were disproportionately convicted of felonies when compared with the corresponding
percentage of Hispanics and African Americans in the state population. Id. at 2–3; see
supra note 166.
193. Simmons, 575 F.3d at 26. “Under the U.S. Constitution, the states generally set
the eligibility criteria for voters.” Id. at 31.
194. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003).
195. All plaintiffs were African American, American Indian, and Hispanic American.
Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (E.D. Wash. 1997).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1309 (“The Court does not agree that the plain statement rule applies to
the VRA. The Civil War Amendments to the United States Constitution have already
changed the usual constitutional balance between the states and the federal government.
The remedial clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically created so that the
federal government could police states for violations of the constitutional rights of racial
minorities . . . The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that Congress has the power
to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments through the VRA, ‘despite the burdens
those measures placed on the states.’” (citation omitted) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997))).
198. Id. at 1308–09.
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external to the felon disenfranchisement provision inadequate to “provide
the requisite causal link between the voting qualification and the prohibited
discriminatory result”199 and granted the state’s motion for summary
judgment.200 When the felons appealed, the Ninth Circuit correctly agreed
with the district court that section 2 of the VRA was applicable to felons
because “[f]elon disenfranchisement is a voting qualification and Section
2 is clear that any voting qualification that denies citizens the right to vote
in a discriminatory manner violates the VRA.”201
The Ninth Circuit properly found that the district court had improperly
ignored evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice system and
surrounding social and historical circumstances that could show a causal
connection between the disenfranchisement provision and disproportionate
impact on minorities’ ineligibility to vote.202 The Ninth Circuit remanded
for the district court “to consider how a challenged voting practice interacts
with external factors such as ‘social and historical conditions’ to result in
denial of the right to vote on account of race or color,” holding that section
2 requires consideration of these factors, including “evidence of
discrimination within the criminal justice system . . . .”203 Although
the district court subsequently rejected petitioning felons’ claim after
reconsideration of evidence of discriminatory effect under the totality of
the circumstances test,204 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that denial, the
Ninth Circuit properly upheld its previous holding that challenges to felon
disenfranchisement laws are cognizable under section 2 of the VRA.205

199. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1011 (describing Farrakhan v. Locke).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1016.
202. Id. at 1016, 1019.
203. Id. at 1011–12 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)). Because
the Brnovich majority did not properly contextualize disparate impact as consideration of
the totality of the circumstances requires, Congress should overturn the Court’s interpretation
of section 2 by amending the statute to clarify how openness, see 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b),
must be analyzed when evaluating the causal link between the voting qualification
and racially discriminatory impact in voting. This would not be the first time the Court’s
interpretation of section 2 required Congress to take remedial action. See supra notes 116–
17 and accompanying text.
204. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 WL 1889273, at *6, *9
(E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006).
205. Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Jonathan Sgro,
Intentional Discrimination in Farrakhan v. Gregoire: The Ninth Circuit’s Voting Rights
Act Standard “Results in” the New Jim Crow, 57 VILL. L. REV. 139, 172–73 (2012).
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VI. PLAIN MEANING TRUMPS CLEAR STATEMENT: THE PLAIN MEANING
OF SECTION 2 PROSCRIBES ANY VOTING QUALIFICATION
THAT HAS A DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT, INCLUDING
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
The Supreme Court should unequivocally reject the analysis applied by
the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits and decline to apply the clear
statement rule. This rule has resulted in simplistic decisions grounded
upon an “initial presumptio[n] that erect[s] potential barriers to the
straightforward effectuation of legislative intent,”206 and its application to
section 2 claims undermines a more sound interpretation under the most
basic cardinal canon of statutory interpretation: plain meaning.207 The
Supreme Court should apply the plain meaning statutory interpretation tool
as applied in Farrakhan to overrule the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits
and find section 2 challenges applicable to felon disenfranchisement laws.208
Under a plain language analysis of section 2, any voting qualification
that has a discriminatory effect violates section 2 of the VRA.209 The question
is then whether a felon disenfranchisement law is a voting qualification
covered by section 2. Both current Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor
and renowned judge and historian Guido Calabresi,210 dissenting in the
206. Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, supra
note 167, at 1959.
207. See id.
208. See Handelsman, supra note 159, at 1898. “The plain language of the VRA is
unambiguous. Section 2 of the VRA clearly applies to ‘any citizen.’ No qualification can
be found that indicates that it does not apply to any citizen convicted of a crime. Because
the language of section 2 of the VRA is clear and unambiguous, there is simply no need
to apply the clear statement rule or examine congressional intent behind the VRA.” Id. at
1936 (footnotes omitted). “VRA challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes must be
permitted to proceed.” Id. at 1939.
209. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 365 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
language of § 2(a) makes perfectly plain that such discriminatory disenfranchisement is barred.”).
210. Judge Calabresi graduated first in his class from Yale Law School and returned
as a law professor and dean prior to his 1994 appointment to the Second Circuit, where he
served until 2009. Guido Calabresi: Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law and Professional
Lecturer in Law, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/guido-calabresi [https://perma.cc/
T3CF-MLNH]. He continues to lecture at Yale. Id. Among his many honors, awards,
and accomplishments, he clerked for Justice Hugo Black of the United States Supreme
Court, received more than fifty honorary degrees from universities across the world, and
authored seven books and hundreds of articles. Id. Often quoted, he is known for his
pioneering work in tort law and economics. Yuval Sinai & Benjamin Shmueli, Calabresi’s
and Maimonides’s Tort Law Theories—A Comparative Analysis and a Preliminary Sketch
of a Modern Model of Differential Pluralistic Tort Liability Based on the Two Theories,
26 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 59, 60 (2014). Former students include Supreme Court Justices
Alito, Thomas, and Sotomayor. Dionne Searcey, Portrait of the Judge . . . as a First-Year
Torts Student, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2009, 3:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BLLB-13445 [https://perma.cc/7MXL-AJF2].
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Second Circuit decision Hayden v. Pataki, unequivocally said, “yes.” Writing
in dissent, Sotomayor stated:
It is plain to anyone reading the Voting Rights Act that it applies to all ‘voting
qualification[s].’ And it is equally plain that § 5–106 disqualifies a group of people
from voting. These two propositions should constitute the entirety of our analysis.
Section 2 of the Act by its unambiguous terms subjects felony disenfranchisement
and all other voting qualifications to its coverage. The duty of a judge is to follow
the law, not to question its plain terms. I do not believe that Congress wishes us
to disregard the plain language of any statute or to invent exceptions to the
statutes it has created.211

An analysis of legislative intent is woefully insufficient to make a legal
determination as to whether section 2 should apply to felon disenfranchisement
laws, and a clear statement by Congress can cut both ways in interpreting
whether section 2 should or should not apply to felon disenfranchisement
laws.212 As noted by Sotomayor, “the [Hayden] majority’s ‘wealth of
persuasive evidence’ that Congress intended felony disenfranchisement
laws to be immune from scrutiny under § 2 of the Act . . . includes not a
single legislator actually saying so.”213
Joining in the dissent, Judge Robert Katzmann agreed not only that the
statute was facially unambiguous in prohibiting any voting qualification
—including a qualification regarding felons—that results in vote abridgement
or denial on account of race, but also that there was “no precedent for not
following the plain language under these circumstances.”214 This was not
“that rare situation where ‘the literal application of a statute will produce
a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters’ . . . because
we have literally no evidence as to the intention of the drafters of the 1982
provision specifically with respect to felon disenfranchisement policies.”215
That is why the most basic statutory interpretation canon, plain meaning,
should be used to construe section 2 as extending to felon disenfranchisement.
In the absence of a clear statement from Congress clarifying its intent
regarding felon disenfranchisement, a refusal to adopt the plain meaning
of the statute would have the perverse effect of reading the statute contrary
to its most basically understood meaning.216 As posited by Justice Sotomayor,
211. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 367–68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
212. See Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d 990, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2010).
213. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 368 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 369 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
215. Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242, (1989)).
216. The “essential import [of section 2’s interlocking provisions, (a) and (b)] is
plain: Courts are to strike down voting rules that contribute to a racial disparity in the
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“if Congress had doubts about the wisdom of subjecting felony
disenfranchisement laws to the results test of § 2, I trust that Congress
would prefer to make any needed changes itself, rather than have courts
do so for it.”217 Judge Katzmann agreed, noting, Congress “is free to amend
§ 1973(a) accordingly.”218 Judge Calabresi, also dissenting, noted that if
Congress wishes to amend the VRA to permit discriminatory felon
disenfranchisement, “it will be able to do so easily,” but that nothing
suggests “the 97th Congress, which was responsible for the ‘dramatic
substantive transformation’ of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, meant the
expansive prohibition of discriminatory results it enacted to apply in any
other way than precisely as written.”219 Therefore, under a reading of plain
meaning, section 2 applies to state felon disenfranchisement laws.
The Supreme Court should also decline to extend the majority’s argument
in Hayden that the statute as a whole did not intend to disrupt state use of
felon disenfranchisement laws. The legislative history for section 4(c)
suggested the section, which categorically prohibits the use of any “test or
device” including “good moral character” requirements, was not intended to
prevent states from implementing felon disenfranchisement laws. 220
Section 4 prohibited good moral character requirements regardless of “whether
or not they can be shown to have discriminatory results.”221 But the amended
section 2 explicitly prohibits discriminatory results. Therefore, the legislative
intent of section 2 must be read and interpreted distinctly from section 4.
Judge Calabresi correctly asserted:
The majority makes much of legislative history showing that Congress did not
intend § 4(c) to forbid felon disenfranchisement. True enough. Felon disenfranchisement
is not prohibited in the absence of a showing that it brings about discriminatory
results. But the statements in legislative history that felon disenfranchisement is
not banned by § 4(c) cannot be taken to imply a wholesale carve-out that exempts
felon disenfranchisement from Voting Rights Act scrutiny altogether, as the majority
asserts. Rather, such legislative statements simply make the uncontroversial point that
felon disenfranchisement laws are not ‘good moral character’ requirements within the
meaning of § 4(c). That, however, is not the issue before us. The fact that race-

opportunity to vote, taking all the relevant circumstances into account.” Brnovich v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2357 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting). The
sweeping language in section 2 is “applica[ble] to every conceivable kind of voting rule,”
and felon disenfranchisement is no exception. Id. at 2361.
217. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 368 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 369 (Katzmann, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 366–67 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (quoting Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen
J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1347, 1347 (1983)).
220. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(c); see S. REP. NO. 89–162, at 24 (1965), as reprinted in
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2565; H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 25–26 (1965), as reprinted in
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2457.
221. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 364 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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neutral felon disenfranchisement is permissible under § 4(c) tells us nothing at all
about whether § 2 allows racially discriminatory felon disenfranchisement.222

Section 2 cannot be read to exclude felon disenfranchisement from the
protections against racially discriminatory effects. Doing so would ignore
the plain meaning of section 2 prohibiting denial of the right to vote on
account of race as a result of any voter qualification.
VII. THE PROPER TEST AND ITS APPLICATION
Because section 2 applies to felon disenfranchisement laws under the
plain language analysis, the Supreme Court should adopt the totality
of the circumstances test articulated in section II of the Voting Rights Act
for two reasons. First, it is the test articulated by the legislature as the
proper analysis for the effects or results test.223 Second, no other test will
address discriminatory effects “root and branch.”224
The totality of the circumstances analysis should be the beginning and
end of the inquiry for a section 2 challenge of a state’s felon disenfranchisement
law. The Senate Judiciary Committee majority report accompanying the
amendments outlined nine typical factors225 that tend to show a section 2
violation. A case should be dismissed only if the petitioner fails to make

222. Id. at 364–65.
223. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (“A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances . . . .”). The Senate Report envisioned a “flexible, fact-intensive test . . . .”
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).
224. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (quoting
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968)). “The objective today remains
to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Segregation was
the evil struck down by Brown I as contrary to the equal protection guarantees of the
Constitution. That was the violation sought to be corrected by the remedial measures of
Brown II.” Id. Green charged school authorities “with the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would
be eliminated root and branch.’” Green, 391 U.S. at 437–38.
225. (1) Any history of official discrimination; (2) the extent of racial polarization in
voting; (3) the use of voting practices that enhance opportunities for discrimination; (4)
whether minorities have been denied access to any candidate slating process; (5) the effects
of discrimination in areas other than voting, such as education, employment, and health on
minority political participation; (6) the use of racial appeals in political campaigns; (7) the
success of minorities in being elected to office; (8) a lack of official responsiveness to
minorities’ needs; (9) whether the purported justification for the voting qualification, standard,
practice, or prerequisite is tenuous. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417,
at 28–29 (1982)). These nine factors are referred to as the “Senate factors.” See Democratic
Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1016–17 (2020).
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a prima facie226 showing that the felon disenfranchisement law has a
discriminatory effect when considering the totality of the circumstances.
Any showing of racially discriminatory effect beyond a mere prima facie
case should go to trial where the petitioner bears the burden to show that
the factors weigh in their favor227 unless the facts are undisputed, and the
court can rule on a motion for summary judgment as a matter of law.228
A. The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Test Applied in Farrakhan but
Clarify its Proper Application Because the Ultimate
Decision in Farrakhan was Wrong
In its 2003 and January, 2010229 opinions, the Ninth Circuit provided a
framework for the totality of the circumstances test that the Supreme
Court should adopt for section 2 challenges to felon disenfranchisement
laws.230 The interplay between the district court’s initial grant of summary
judgment, Ninth Circuit remand, district court handling of the remand, and
initial231 Ninth Circuit reversal of summary judgment for state defendants
226. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining properly a prima
facie case where a felon disenfranchisement law violates section 2 as proving (1) significant
racial disparities in the operation of the criminal justice system (2) that cannot be explained as
race neutral and (3) those non-race-neutral disparities in the criminal justice system
directly result in significant racial disparities in the qualification to vote).
227. See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 WL 1889273, at *8
(E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006) (requiring plaintiffs to show that the Senate factors weigh in
their favor).
228. For summary judgment, the ultimate question of law the court determines
is whether the undisputed facts presented by the petitioners sufficiently prove that the
state’s felon disenfranchisement laws have a discriminatory effect. See, e.g., Farrakhan
II, 590 F.3d at 1004. If the state is the party moving for summary judgment, the state
“need only point out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case,” but if “the State fails to demonstrate that there is an absence of evidence to support
[the p]laintiffs’ case, then the State’s summary judgment motion must be denied.” Id.
at 1003. In considering the motion for summary judgment, the judge must weigh and consider
all of the enumerated factors relevant to the case. Id. at 1004. Factors that are not relevant
to the case for which plaintiffs provide no evidence should not be counted against the
plaintiffs, and sufficiently compelling evidence of a single factor may be sufficient if the
evidence proves the discriminatory effect of the state felon disenfranchisement law on
protected minorities by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Compare Farrakhan, 2006
WL 1889273, at *8.
229. The Author specifies the month to distinguish the Farrakhan January, 2010
panel decision from the en banc decision in October, 2010.
230. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003); Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at
996.
231. The en banc majority that same year reversed the panel’s decision by improperly
reinjecting the requirement to prove intentional racial discrimination that the 1982 amendments
unequivocally rejected. See Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). This
ultimate decision of Farrakhan, commonly referred to as Farrakhan III, completely
missed the issue and not only misapplied the correct test but ignored the explicit will of

972

ATKINSON (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 933, 2021]

3/25/2022 3:21 PM

Racially Discriminatory Felon Disenfranchisement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

with instructions to enter summary judgment for plaintiff felons illuminates
both proper and improper application of the totality of the circumstances
test. In 2003, the Ninth Circuit panel correctly remanded Farrakhan for
failure to consider all external factors within the totality of the circumstances
analysis.232 On remand in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, rather than focus on
factors 5 and 9,233 which plaintiffs asserted were the only factors here
applicable to vote denial, the district court correctly agreed with state
defendants that all the factors must be considered.234
However, there is no requirement that any particular number of factors
be proven, and these factors are not to be understood as exhaustive or
exclusive.235 Although factor 5 was simply one factor in the totality of the
circumstances the Court must consider when evaluating the plaintiffs’
claim, the district court does not seem to have directly considered that
factor 5 alone could be sufficient to succeed on a section 2 challenge. 236
Because no specific weight can be accorded each factor and each factor
may take on greater or lesser significance in the context of each case, the
plaintiffs’ inability to meet certain factors must not be automatically construed
to weigh in the state’s favor.237 The government may attack the sufficiency
of the plaintiffs’ evidence or present countervailing evidence tending to
question or negate the factors tending to show a racially discriminatory
effect, but may not simply argue that an inability to satisfy multiple factors
justifies a finding for the state. A strong showing of one factor, or compelling
evidence of a racially discriminatory effect from a non-enumerated factor,
may still satisfy a showing of a violation of section 2 where the state fails
to contradict or disprove the plaintiffs’ evidence, or prove the plaintiffs’
evidence insufficient to show a discriminatory effect.

Congress to excise the intent requirement from the Voting Rights Act. See generally S.
REP. NO. 89-162, at 21 (1965). In this final decision, the court, without proper justification
or precedent, reinserted the intent requirement and expressed skepticism that felon
disenfranchisement laws could be challenged under section 2, without actually finding that
section 2 could not apply to a felon disenfranchisement law. See Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d
at 993–94.
232. See Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1011–12, 1120; Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273,
at *3–4.
233. Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at *7.
234. Id.
235. See Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1019.
236. See Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at *7.
237. Id. at *8.
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This is where the district court once again got the analysis wrong on
remand, as rightly recognized by the majority opinion on the second Ninth
Circuit panel in January, 2010.238 After the 2003 remand, and despite its
conclusion that the “evidence of racial bias in Washington’s criminal
justice system [was] compelling,”239 the district court concluded the plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden to show that the Senate Factors weighed in their
favor because “the remaining Senate Factors weigh[ed] in Defendants’
favor.”240 The finding of “compelling” evidence of racial bias should have
been sufficient to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Instead, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that the totality of the circumstances did not support a finding that
Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law resulted in discrimination on
account of race despite no showing by the state that the felons had failed
to demonstrate sufficient evidence.241
In January, 2010, the Ninth Circuit panel majority rightly disagreed
with the district court’s application of the totality of the circumstances
analysis and considered the evidence of discrimination in the criminal
justice system under factor 5242 sufficient to show “that the discriminatory
impact of Washington’s felon disenfranchisement is attributable to racial
discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system.”243 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit panel found “that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement
law violates § 2 of the VRA,” thereby reversing the district court’s grant
of the state defendant’s motion for summary judgment with instructions
to grant plaintiff’s summary judgment on remand.244 This Ninth Circuit
majority opinion correctly recognized that a single factor could, on its
own, provide sufficient evidence upon a sufficient showing of a single
factor that has not been refuted by the defendants.245 However, as noted
238. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We agree with Plaintiffs for
the reason that, given the strength of their Factor 5 showing, the district court erred in
requiring them to prove Factors that had little if any relevance to their particular vote denial
claim.”).
239. Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at *9.
240. Id. at *8 (finding that factor 1 favored defendants; that plaintiffs “failed to
present any substantial evidence regarding” factors 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8; that factor 9 favored
defendants, not because defendants had explained or presented evidence as to how or why
the state’s disenfranchisement of felons fulfilled a legitimate state interest, but because the
Constitution explicitly recognizes state power to disenfranchise felons; and finding that
factors 1 and 9 cut towards summary judgment for defendants in spite of the compelling
evidence presented by plaintiffs under factor 5).
241. Id. at *9.
242. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 995–96, 1004.
243. Id. at 1016.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1004. “Reviewing the reports of Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, the district
court found that Plaintiffs had presented ‘compelling evidence of racial discrimination and
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by dissenting Judge M. Margaret McKeown, the Ninth Circuit overstepped
the role of the district court as factfinder by not remanding for reconsideration
of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment under proper application
of the totality of the circumstances test, considering all Senate Factors
“and perhaps additional relevant considerations” holistically, rather than
a check-the-box balancing of factors.246 This first section 2 victory for
disenfranchised felons was defeated that same year when an en banc court
agreed to rehearing at the state’s request and reversed the January panel’s
decision while narrowing the possibility of a future victory under section
2 by, nonsensically, requiring a showing of intentional discrimination247—
the very court finding the 1982 congressional amendments sought to
prevent.248
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reject the majority’s improper
conclusion in the en banc decision in Farrakhan III, but should adopt the
totality of the circumstances analysis as properly applied by the Ninth
Circuit panel in January, 2010.
B. The Supreme Court Should Not Permit Burden Shifting
The proper test should require plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that, under the totality of the circumstances, the felon
disenfranchisement law impermissibly results in vote denial of African
Americans as a protected class. Other authors have suggested that, in
section 2 vote denial cases, defendants should still prevail even after a
plaintiff has carried their burden of production if able to demonstrate that

bias in Washington’s criminal justice system.’ . . . Moreover, ‘contrary to Defendants’
assertion that these reports are based solely on statistics and are thus insufficient evidence
for a VRA claim,’ the district court found that ‘these experts’ conclusions, drawn from the
available statistical data, are admissible, relevant, and persuasive.’ . . . The district court
also found it significant that Defendants had not ‘presented any evidence to refute Plaintiffs’
experts’ conclusions.’ . . . Thus, the district court concluded that it was ‘compelled to find
that there is discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system on account of
race,’ . . . and that such discrimination ‘clearly hinders the ability of racial minorities to
participate effectively in the political process, as disenfranchisement is automatic.’” Id. at
995 (quoting Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at *6).
246. Id. at 1018, 1020 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
247. Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010).
248. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 366–67 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting).
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the state interests outweigh the burden on voters.249 Although the “weight,
as well as tenuousness, of the state’s interest is a legitimate factor in
analyzing the totality of circumstances,”250 permitting this type of burden
shifting that allows the state to explain away its discriminatory practice
defeats the purpose and spirit of both the Fifteenth Amendment and the
VRA.251 Arguments that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment supersedes
the Fifteenth Amendment and VRA are baseless: Granting states full
power to deny the right to vote to felons cannot be said to also permit
enactment of felon disenfranchisement laws that result in denial of the
right to vote on account of race. 252 The promise of Hunter—that a
presumptively constitutional felon disenfranchisement law is unconstitutional
if violative of equal protection 253—should extend by similar logic to
section 2 of the VRA to find that felon disenfranchisement laws with
racially discriminatory results in voting disqualification impermissibly
violate the VRA and cannot stand. No compelling state interest can overcome
an impermissibly racially discriminatory effect.254 In the circumstances of
a discriminatory effect, burden shifting should be rejected as impermissible
tolerance of justifying discrimination. To allow a state to show a compelling
state interest justifying policies with a discriminatory effect denies the
foundational impermissibility of the discriminatory effect in the first place.

249. See Sgro, supra note 205, at 173–74 (suggesting that, after plaintiffs make a
prima facie case of disparate impact on minority voters and “show that racial bias in the
criminal justice system contributed to the disproportionate disenfranchisement of minority
voters,” the burden shifts to the state “to show that the practice is narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.” More specifically, the state “would have to show that there is
a race-neutral explanation for the disparate effects in the criminal justice system, not just
that the law itself is facially race-neutral”); see also Tokaji, supra note 102, at 692–
93 (recommending a “burden-shifting test” for section 2 vote denial claims whereby,
after plaintiffs meet the initial burden “to show that the challenged practice interacts with
social and historical conditions” to “resul[t] in the disproportionate denial of minority
votes,” the state “would then have the opportunity to show that the practice is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest”).
250. Although Fairley is a vote dilution case, its analysis of factor 9 bears on its
similar application in a vote denial case. Fairley v. Hattiesburg, 122 F. Supp. 3d 553, 578
(S.D. Miss. 2015) (citing Clark v. Calhoun Cnty., 88 F.3d 1393, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996)).
251. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 997 (“Congress enacted the VRA of 1965, pursuant
to its enforcement power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, for the ‘broad remedial
purpose of ridding the country of racial discrimination in voting.’” (quoting Farrakhan I,
338 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003)).
252. Farrakhan I defined the “on account of” requirement as being met when “the
discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is attributable to racial discrimination in
the surrounding social and historical circumstances,” including the state’s criminal justice
system. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1019–20.
253. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 222–24, 227–28 (1985).
254. Although a state can justify its decision to disenfranchise felons by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot justify doing so when the result is discriminatory.
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Because the discriminatory effect itself is statutorily impermissible,255 no
state interest can justify it.
C. Federalism Arguments Should be Dismissed as an Attempt to
Relitigate What has Already Been Litigated
Authors argue that Congress has exceeded its enforcement power
granted by the Fifteenth Amendment in a manner that cannot permissibly
“circumvent” the Fourteenth Amendment sanction of state felon
disenfranchisement laws.256 But section 2 of the VRA does not limit the
authority and sovereignty of states to craft felon disenfranchisement laws;257
it only strikes down those laws that have an impermissibly discriminatory
effect. This is precisely what the authority granted to Congress by the
Fifteenth Amendment was intended to accomplish, and precisely why the
VRA was enacted by Congress to begin with.258 Permitting section 2
challenges to state felon disenfranchisement laws is not incompatible with
the federalist principles safeguarding state sovereignty to have felon
disenfranchisement laws.259 A section 2 challenge no further curtails state
sovereignty than to set any other voter qualification. As with any other voter
qualification that a state may adopt, section 2 only prohibits a racially
discriminatory effect, not the adoption of felon disenfranchisement laws
per se. Judge Calabresi pointed out the majority opinion in Hayden v.
Pataki incorrectly read the VRA to per se ban felon disenfranchisement
when all that the VRA prohibits is “felon disenfranchisement laws that
result in the denial or dilution of voting rights on the basis of race.”260
Judge Calabresi asserted that the majority missed the issue entirely by
failing to distinguish between race-neutral felon disenfranchisement and
racially discriminatory felon disenfranchisement when it is clear that the
VRA has no bearing on the former but proscribes the latter.261

255. See supra notes 107, 198 and accompanying text.
256. Clegg, Conway III & Lee, supra note 45, at 14–15.
257. See id. at 14 (“The text of the VRA makes no clear statement about felon
disenfranchisement. Therefore, it cannot be construed . . . [to prohibit] felon disenfranchisement.”).
258. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
259. See Clegg, Conway III & Lee, supra note 45, at 14 (“The Constitution provides
that the States have the primary, if not exclusive, authority to decide whether felons should
vote.”).
260. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 363 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 362–65.
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Thus, section 2 does not threaten Richardson, nor does section 2 threaten
state sovereignty in any impermissibly meaningful manner. The suggestion
that section 2 may “incur significant ‘federalism costs’” ignores the wellestablished principle that state sovereignty is necessarily limited when states
discriminate against a protected class.262 There should be no “safe harbor”263
for racial discrimination, and that must include felon disenfranchisement statutes
that result in racially discriminatory vote denial.
D. Mass Incarceration of African Americans Since Slavery: State Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws May Violate Section 2 by Having
a Disparate Impact on African Americans
as a Protected Class
The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits’ use of historical arguments to
justify denial of a section 2 challenge is a double-edge sword. These circuits
properly interpret and situate the general history of felon disenfranchisement
as long-accepted and long-established but fail to grapple with the nexus
of felon disenfranchisement and racially discriminatory effect in the
context of disproportionate incarceration of African Americans. There is
an inherent tension in using history to justify continuance of a practice that
may once not have had an impermissible racially discriminatory effect but
now has had a racially discriminatory effect under increasingly disproportionate
criminalization of African Americans in more recent history over the past
half century.264 Consider this: The lifetime risk of incarceration of African
Americans has doubled since the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.265 These changed circumstances have changed history and
require reevaluation of history as a continued justification for felon
disenfranchisement laws.
In the past fifty years, the U.S. prison population rose from a steady,
level 200,000 in the early 1900s to just over 1.4 million in 2018.266 The
rising trend began in the 1980s when the Reagan Administration commenced
262. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). See generally
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado state constitutional
amendment denying judicial, legislative, and executive protections from discrimination
based on “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships”);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (striking down a California
statute forbidding issuance of commercial fishing licenses to aliens “ineligible to citizenship”).
263. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 365.
264. See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 46–47 (2012); Daniel S. Goldman, Note, The
Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfranchisement and Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 611, 627–28 (2004).
265. See Forman, supra note 264, at 22.
266. THE SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 58, at 1.
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the War on Drugs.267 As of July 1, 2019, the U.S. Census reported that
the national white population was 60% in comparison with 13% Black;268
yet, in 2018, only an estimated 6% of sentenced white males in state and
federal prisons were ages 18 to 24, compared to 12% of Black prisoners.269
“Black males ages 18 to 19 were 12.7 times as likely to be imprisoned as
white males of the same ages . . . .”270 That means not only that African
American young adults are disproportionately incarcerated, but that they
are losing the right to vote as soon as they obtain it at a significantly higher
rate, and therefore losing the right to vote for a significantly longer period
of their life than white males. One in three Black men born in 2001 is
likely to be imprisoned in their lifetime, as compared to 1 in 17 white
men.271
Nationally, African Americans are disproportionately penalized at every
stage of the criminal justice system, from arrest, to charging, to jury
representation, to sentencing.272 The result: Higher rates of felony conviction
for African Americans, despite data showing that Black crime is not higher
than crime by other groups.273 However, it is unlikely that indisputable
statistical evidence will invalidate all felon disenfranchisement laws.
There may be states whose disenfranchisement laws are found to have no
racially discriminatory effect where plaintiffs fail to provide compelling

267. ALEXANDER, supra note 58, at 60. The discriminatory results of the drug war
are clear; in seven states, 80–90% of imprisoned drug offenders are Black, although the
disparities cannot be explained by disproportionate drug use given that Black drug
use does not exceed that of any other racial group. Paul Butler, One Hundred Years of
Race and Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043, 1048 (2010).
268. Quick Facts: People, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/3VZG-XVZJ].
269. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T JUST., PRISONERS IN 2018, at 15 (2020). Overall,
the imprisonment rate for Black males was 5.8 times that of white males in 2018. Id. at
16.
270. Id. at 17.
271. THE SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 58, at 5.
272. Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Incarceration of African Americans:
What History and the First Decade of Twenty-First Century Have Brought, 11 J. INST.
JUST. & INT’L STUD. 87, 100–05 (2011).
273. See Camille Caldera, Fact Check: Rates of White-on-White and Black-on-Black
Crime Are Similar, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2020, 5:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/factcheck/2020/09/29/fact-check-meme-shows-incorrect-homicide-stats-race/57395
22002/ [https://perma.cc/8WDD-6RUB]; Troy L. Smith, Stop Using “Black-on-Black”
Crime to Deflect Away from Police Brutality, CLEVELAND (June 14, 2020, 6:57 AM),
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2020/06/stop-using-black-on-black-crime-to-deflectaway-from-police-brutality.html [https://perma.cc/789V-7VL6].
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non-statistical evidence that the felon disenfranchisement laws cause a
racially discriminatory effect.274 However, where there is indisputable
evidence of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, plaintiff
felons should, as in Farrakhan v. Washington, be permitted to show that
a state’s felon disenfranchisement scheme has a racially discriminatory
effect and violates section 2.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Some states are recognizing the role race impermissibly plays in
disenfranchisement laws that do not acknowledge discriminatory intent
on their face. However, state self-reflection is not enough; it is not a remedy
for petitioners who have a right to protections under the VRA as a protected
class. The ability of a petitioner with a felony conviction to bring a section
2 challenge is as important today as ever to recognize the intent of the
Fifteenth Amendment and prevent felon disenfranchisement from being
another vestige of racial discrimination.
Further, denying the right to vote to ex-felons does not best serve
community interests. 275 Restoring the right to vote incentivizes civic
engagement, and social science data suggests that permitting ex-felons to
vote may reduce recidivism;276 conversely, states that do disenfranchise
felons see higher rates of recidivism.277 Mr. Windham described the
importance of being able to vote from his perspective as a previously
274. See supra notes 114 and 115 and accompanying text.
275. Rather, “denying ex-offenders the vote impedes their reintegration into society
by stigmatizing them as second-class citizens.” Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The
Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 1045, 1113. James Jeter, the founder of the Dwight Hall Civic Allyship Initiative,
explained in a webinar that “people coming home seek redemption. They want to prove
that they have value. And [being able to vote] gives them that right to be active civilly
which empowers them to believe in themselves.” See ABA Section of Civil Rights and
Social Justice, Restoration of Voting Rights: The Elimination of Felony Disenfranchisement,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hHJ5UVVAY7U [perma.cc/
X5RH-DS8X]. To learn more about Mr. Jeter, who worked with at-risk youth, raised
money for local food banks, and addressed gun violence with the Hartford, Connecticut
Police Chief during his nearly twenty years incarcerated at Cheshire Correctional
Institution, see Leadership, YALE P RISON EDUC . INITIATIVE , https://www.yaleprison
educationinitiative. org/team [https://perma.cc/2U9F-HWBR].
276. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest:
Evidence from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 212–15 (2004).
In this Minnesota study analyzing the effect of voting behavior on recidivism rates, those
with past felony convictions who voted in 1996 were more than half as likely to be arrested
from 1997 to 2000 as those who did not vote. Id. at 204–06.
277. See Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness:
The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407,
429 (2012).
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incarcerated Black man with a felony conviction. “Without (the right to
vote), I have no say. I’m just locked out of the system and can’t vote on
the laws that ensnared me.278 It’s a voice. For years, I had no voice. My
brothers in prison right now have no voice.”
Mr. Windham was politically active while incarcerated,279 and he could
not wait to vote when he was released. He was crushed when he was told:
“‘You are on parole, but you can’t vote.’ I felt like the star player at
the Superbowl sent home with my football before I could even play.”280
He described taking his wife and son to the post office and sitting outside
while they voted: a painful reminder of second-class citizenship. 281
Thanks to the passage of Prop 17,282 he cast his first vote ever in California’s
September recall election.283 “The good thing is you (the people of California)
empowered me with the power to vote, so I will go back to my community
now and teach them the power of the vote,” he said. “I care what’s happening
in my community.”284
Others similarly situated to Mr. Windham in states that have not relaxed
felon disenfranchisement laws will have to wait longer than their next
election to cast their vote. Until states decide to recognize that felon
disenfranchisement laws frustrate rather than further state interests, when
a state law violates section 2, the state must remedy it.

278. Telephone Interview with John Windham, supra note 3. For Mr. Windham,
voting gives him a platform to counteract the injustices he has experienced. Id. When
asked how race plays a factor in people’s resistance to letting people with a felony record
vote, Mr. Windham replied, “Look at the majority of people incarcerated. The vast majority is
people of color. So, if you take away my right to vote, I don’t have a leg to stand on for
housing or employment.” Id.
279. Despite not having the right to vote until the passage of Prop. 17, Mr. Windham
engaged Governor Gavin Newsom in conversation and spearheaded letter writing campaigns
to congressional representatives while incarcerated. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
283. Telephone Interview with John Windham (Nov. 12, 2021). “It was a liberating
experience,” he said. Id.
284. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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